Kolloquium:
Militär und Staatlichkeit
29.-30.04.2002
Ort: Halle, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Universitätsring 5 (Ecke Universitätsplatz), Hallischer Saal
Zeit: 29.–30. April 2002, jeweils 9.00–17.00 Uhr
Kontakt: Prof. Dr. J. Paul · paul@orientphil.uni-halle.de / PD Dr. I. Schneider · schneider@orientphil.uni-halle.de
Das Kolloquium befasst sich mit Formen und Verläufen der Interaktion von nomadisch und sesshaft lebenden Gruppen im Bereich von Militär und Staatlichkeit.
In der jahrtausendelangen Geschichte der Koexistenz nomadischer und sesshafter Lebensformen im Trockengürtel der Alten Welt haben sich spezifische Formen militärischen und staatlichen Handelns herausgebildet. Sesshafte Staaten in der Region haben Strategien der Abwehr und Integration nomadischer Gruppen entwickelt, die weitreichende Auswirkungen auf die Strukturen politischen und militärischen Handelns in der nomadischen Welt hatten. Andererseits wird militärische Kompetenz oft als ein Kennzeichen nomadisch lebender Gruppen angesehen. Im Verlauf militärischer Unternehmungen von Nomaden, die fallweise auch als Beutekrieg beginnen können, kam es bisweilen zu Staatsbildungen, wobei die ursprünglichen politischen Strukturen der kämpfenden nomadischen Verbände tiefgreifenden Änderungen unterlagen.
Ausstellungsbesuch:
Alle Teilnehmer des Kolloquiums sind herzlich eingeladen zum gemeinsamen Besuch der Ausstellung "Das Universum ist eine Scheibe. Der Schatz von Sangerhausen", integriert in die Ausstellung "Schönheit, Macht und Tod".
Sonntag, 28.04., 17.45 Uhr, Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte, Richard-Wagner-Straße 9–10.
Empfang:
Alle Teilnehmer des Kolloquiums sind herzlich eingeladen zu einem Auftakt-Treffen am Sonntag, 28.04., 19.30 Uhr, im Orientwissenschaftlichen Zentrum, Mühlweg 5.
Programme
29. April 2002
Halle, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Universitätsring 5 (Ecke Universitätsplatz), Hallischer Saal
9.15 Uhr | Prof. Dr. Jürgen Paul, Halle: |
10.00 Uhr | Dr. Matthias Rogg, Potsdam: |
10.45 - 11.00 Uhr | Kaffeepause |
11.00 Uhr | Prof. Dr. Hugh Kennedy, St. Andrews: |
11.45 Uhr | Dr. Marek Olbrycht, Krakow: |
12.30 - 14.00 Uhr | Mittagessen: "Barfüß", Barfüßerstraße |
14.00 Uhr | Sören Stark, M.A, Halle: |
14.45 Uhr | Prof. Dr. Kurt Beck, München: |
15.30 - 15.45 Uhr | Kaffeepause |
15.45 Uhr | Prof. Dr. Michael Bollig, Köln: |
16.30 Uhr | Dr. Dietmar Schorkowitz, Berlin: |
18.30 Uhr | Abendessen: Gasthaus "Zum Schad", Reilstrasse 10 |
30. April 2002
Halle, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Universitätsring 5 (Ecke Universitätsplatz), Hallischer Saal
9.15 Uhr | Prof. Dr. John Perry, Chicago: |
10.00 Uhr | Dr. W. Rhoads Murphey, Birmingham: |
10.45 - 11.00 Uhr | Kaffeepause |
11.00 Uhr | PD Dr. Stefan Heidemann, Leipzig: |
11.45 Uhr | PD Dr. Irene Schneider, Halle: |
12.30 - 13.30 Uhr | Mittagessen: "Barfüß", Barfüßerstraße |
Abstracts
Das Ende der Razzien. Nomaden und staatliche Ordnung im anglo-ägyptischen Sudan
Kurt Beck
In meinem Beitrag behandle ich Prozesse der staatlichen Unterwerfung und Pazifizierung der nomadischen Gesellschaft der Ostsahara in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Ich untersuche, wie die Herrschaft der Razzien durch die Herrschaft staatlichen Rechts abgelöst wird. Sofern die Zeit ausreicht, gebe ich einen Ausblick auf das Wiederaufleben der Herrschaft der Razzia in den 90er Jahren.
“We turned our enemies into baboons.” Pastoral Identity, Ritual and Weapons in Pokot Warfare, Northern Kenya
Michael Bollig
The arid and semi-arid lands of East and Northeast Africa have become the arena of excessively violent interactions between various local groups and external power-groups such as army units and police patrols. Nomadic Pastoralists are frequently engaged in violent conflicts with agricultural and pastoral neighbours and the military. Violent interactions rarely result in drawn out battles, but are rather constituted by skirmishes and sudden attacks. The paper examines the case of the pastoral Pokot and their engagement in violent conflicts in detail. Intra-ethnic conflict management amongst the Pokot is characterised by mainly peaceful strategies. Physical violence is only permitted in certain highly ritualised forms. In sharp contrast to this, inter-group conflicts are exceedingly violent. Since the 1960s guns are of crucial importance for the success and failure of violent strategies in this region. Intergroup violence in northern Kenya is deeply embedded in local cultures and is thoroughly modern at the same time. Success and failure of violent strategies are determined by the access to modern weaponry and ammunition.
Linkages to international arms-markets are as important for the understanding of violence as local ideas on honour and violence are. The fieldwork based paper will offer a dense description of the cultural ramifications of violence and of the ways local conflicts are linked up to weapon's trade networks. In a concluding section an attempt at generalisations with a regional scope is made: in what way do East African pastoralists develop specific patterns of conflict behaviour and to what extent are these patterns changed through the integration into inter-regional trade networks.
Arab Nomads and the Seljuq Military
Stefan Heidemann
States or realms dominated by Arab nomads existed in Northern Syria and Northern Mesopotamia during the first half of the 5th/11th century. Their base was the nomad camp. They were almost autonomous from the great regional powers, the Fatimids, the Buyids and the Byzantine empire and achieved to employ them to act in their interest, although they acknowledged formally their overlordship.
At the end of the century, after the Seljuq conquest of the region, the situation reversed. The Seljuq state was a military state, ruling the country from fortified fortresses and cities. The great ruling Arab tribes were destroyed in battles and massacres. Subgroups survived by total accommodation to the Seljuq style of government and far reaching submission, namely the `Uqailids of Qal`at Ja`bar and the Munqidhids of Shaizar. However in military terms they tried to maintain a neutral position.
A hundred years later the situation changed again under the offspring of the Seljuq regime, the Ayyubids. The last residues of the Bedouin principalities had disappeared. New tribal groups had entered the region and were newly formed. The much developed Ayyubid state which was dependent on the security of the overland routes tried to integrate them by giving them a legitimate place within the state. They created the formal position of the "amir al-`arab" who should control the other Arab nomad tribes on their behalf.
The transition from the structure of the Bedouin and to the later Seljuq states will be discussed with a focus on the different constraints for the financing of military power.
Die Skythen und die griechischen Kolonien des nördlichen Schwarzmeergebietes im 7.–5. Jh. v. Chr. Das Problem des nomadischen Protektorats
Askold Ivantchik
Der Vortrag ist den Beziehungen zwischen den nomadischen Skythen und den griechischen Kolonien gewidmet, die am Ende des 7. Jhs. v. Chr. an der nördlichen Küste des Schwarzen Meers gegründet wurden. Die archäologischen Angaben zeugen davon, daß die nomadische Steppenbevölkerung in der Zeit der Gründung der griechischen Kolonien unzahlreich war. Die Beziehungen zwischen den Griechen und Barbaren waren hier im 6. Jh. v.Chr. meistens friedlich. Mehrere einheimische archäologische Denkmäler sind von der griechischen Kultur beeinflußt; in einigen Fällen bildeten sich sogar gemeinsame griechisch-skythische Kulte. Einheimische Elemente waren auch in der Bevölkerung der griechischen Städte anwesend, aber sie stammten meistens nicht aus den benachbarten Steppengebieten, sondern aus den Waldsteppen, die mehr entfernt waren und deren Bevölkerung seßhaft war. Die Lage verändert sich am Anfang des 5. Jhs v.Chr. Die nomadische Bevölkerung der Steppen nimmt stark zu, was wahrsheinlich durch die Ankunft einer neuen Nomadenwelle von Osten zu erklären ist. Gleichzeitig fängt die skythische Expansion gegen die griechischen Kolonien an und die Skythen versuchen zum ersten Mal diese Kolonien politisch zu unterwerfen. Die griechischen Städte des Bosporus haben sich zu einem vereinigten Reich zusammengeschlossen und gelungen, diese Expansion abzuschlagen. Die Städte des westlichen Teils des Schwarzmeergebietes (Olbia, Nikonion und Tyras) sowie Kerkinitis im westlichen Krim hatten dagegen die skythischen Herrschaft anzuerkennen. Die konkreten Formen dieser Herrschaft, die als "Protektorat" von einigen Forschern (Yu. Vinogradov) bestimmt wurde, sind jedoch nicht ganz klar. Die skythischen Könige prägten in jedem Fall ihre Münzen in griechischen Städten, ernannten ihre Vertreter oder Statthalter, bekamen einen Tribut von ihnen. Es ist auch möglich, daß sie den Handel dieser Städte kontrollierten. Die skythische Kontrolle war jedoch nicht rigid oder formalisiert: die griechische Poleis erhielten alle ihre innere Strukture und Institutionen und waren sogar in ihrer Außenpolitik ziemlich frei. Einige von ihnen waren z.B. Mitglieder der Athenischen Seebundes. Das skythische Protektorat existierte wahrscheinlich bis zum Anfang des 4. Jhs v.Chr, wenn eine neue Etappe der skythisch-griechischen Beziehungen im Schwarzmeergebiet angefangen hat.
Military Pay and State Formation in Early Islam
Hugh Kennedy
Pre-Islamic Arabia had no real state apparatus and no military organisation beyond the simple assembling of tribal hosts. Nor was there any system of rewards for participation in warfare apart from booty, usually in animals, and the honour of the tribe. The conquest of the Fertile Crescent and later Egypt and Iran changed all this. The Arab tribes were now masters of vast and wealthy lands whose inhabitants were accustomed to pay taxes to a government. In the aftermath of the conquests, the Muslim leadership decided that these lands were not going to be divided among the tribes men but rather that they were to be settled in garrison cities and live off the revenues produced by the conquered lands. This is most clearly demonstrated in Iraq and Egypt: not only were these the two richest areas of the early Islamic world, but they are also the areas which have yielded the fullest documentation.
The revenues from these lands became known collectively as the fay. The struggle for the control of the fay of Iraq was to be the defining factor in the construction of the early Islamic state. After the conquests, the names of the members of the victorious armies were inscribed in lists known as diwans and membership of the diwan entitled the holder to a share of the fay. This much was generally agreed but after that, there were crucial areas of dispute and two distinct parties emerged. The first may be called the localists. They believed that the fay was the hereditary property of the collective of the warriors who had seized it and their descendants. They were entitled to their pay ('ata) by hereditary right, a right which was given canonical validity by ascribing the origins of the system to the caliphs 'Umar (634-44) and 'Ali (656-61). Any fay which remained after the payments of 'ata to those entitled was to be distributed by them as they saw fit. There was no room in this vision for the mechanisms of central government. 'Ata was the reward for past achievement, not payment for present or future service in the army.
Clearly such a system would mean that wealth, power and patronage would lie with the local settlers and the government of the Caliphs would have neither patronage nor the power of coercion. From 694 to 714 the governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj b. Yusuf, waged a long struggle to secure control over the fay for the government and its servants. He insisted that 'ata should be a military salary and should only be paid to those who fought the Umayyad army and obeyed Umayyad orders. Any surplus revenue was to be sent to Damascus or spent by governors appointed by the regime. This provoked a prolonged and violent reaction among many in Iraq who felt that their rightful status and property were being threatened. By the time of al-Hajjaj's death, however, the cause of the state had triumphed: the fay of Iraq was used to pay a standing army of Syrians, loyal to the regime, while the majority of the local Muslim Arab population were subjects, disenfranchised and excluded from the diwan.
By 714, the settlements of fiscally autonomous tribesmen had been replaced by a real state apparatus, with powers of patronage and coercion. The Islamic state had been born.
Primary and Secondary Roles of Nomadic Groups of the Eastern Anatolian Borderlands in the Defining and Resolution of Ottoman-Safavid Military Conflict in the Early Seventeenth Century
W. Rhoads Murphey
The inner workings and internal dynamics of tribes and of tribal confederations have always suffered -- from the time of Ibn Khaldun's Mukaddimah onwards -- the fate of being understood, evaluated and appreciated (or the reverse) through the prism of the state and its priorities and objectives. When tribes were pliable and co-operative with the state and accepting of the roles assigned to them by the state, they became objects of praise in standard contemporary historiography. Conversely, when their objectives were in opposition to or disassociated from the state's, they all too easily lapsed into the familiar typology and reoccupied their traditional Khaldunian position as the "sowers of sedition and the ultimate source of social disorder". This idealized conception and mythology of state-tribe relations of course becomes superfluous when the state itself is created as a tribal polity as happened in the 15th century with the formation of dynastic orders such as the Timurids and the Ak-Koyunlu. Later on, even after the creation of more enduring mixed polities and centralizing states such as the Ottoman and Safavid empires, tribes continued to play a number of key roles, but their place within these imperial orders cannot be understood properly when confined to the analytical straightjacket of oppositional politics and the oversimplistic classification of tribes into two contrasting groups : the successfully subordinated (co-operative) and incompletely subordinated (non-coperative) tribes. As an alternative to viewing the tribes only as participators in and contributors to the fixed agendas set by their respective imperial "masters", this paper will explore the ways in which by fulfilling primary and secondary roles ostensibly assigned to them by state authority, they were sometimes able -- in a more dynamic, fluid and self-determining way -- to defend their own interests and at times even to extend their sphere of independent action and influence within those states. In the context of Safavid-Ottoman state-to-state relations, the focusing and intensification of their imperial rivalry in key strategic zones of the frontier paradoxically created as many opportunities for enhanced independence and leadership for the tribes as it did for the extension of state authority. Examples of this phenomenon of resurgence of tribal influence drawn from the middle years of Abbas's reign will be examined with a view to reassessing his reputation for successful subordination of the tribes as developed in the dynastic histories.
After an initial period of relative quiet on the northeastern Anatolian front with Azerbaijan and on the southeastern front with Iraq in the 1590s, the tribal borderlands of the Ottoman- and Safavid empires became the battle ground for a renewed -- and in some ways uncharacteristically determined -- phase of the ongoing imperial rivalry prompted by the Safavid re-capture of Tabriz in 1603. As a consequence of the renewal and escalation of inter-state hostilities in this period, both rulers were inevitably drawn into the game of re-establishing and ensuring the 'dependent' status of their respective subordinated and semi-subordinated tribes as both states had staked their imperial reputations on the outcome of this high stakes competition for the loyalty and co-operation of their respective tribal populations. Under such politically-charged circumstances, compromises, blandishments and inducements had to work hand in hand with dictates, demands and orders to secure the fullest possible level of co-operation from the tribes whose loyalty and support was (as both sides fully realized) easily transferable to the opposing side in the imperial conflict. In the particular historical context of the renewal of Safavid Ottoman competition for control of the Azeri corridor vital to the interests of both states, the dictum ' divide et impera ' gained a peculiar relevance to the position of the tribes; this time not as objects of the centralizing and subordinating aims of powerful states and would-be hegemons, but as promoters of their own interests. The tribes sought and found the means to play both sides off against the middle and to capitalize on opportunities offered by the complex matrix of fluid borders, changing alliances and the heightened strategic importance that their own native, tribal and patrimonial homelands now possessed in the wartime context to renegotiate and redefine the terms of their clientship, loyalty and dependency in relation to their respective nominal overlords both sultan and shah.
Nomadic Components in the Social Structure and Military System of Parthian Iran
Marek Olbrycht
The Arsacid kingdom of Parthia came into existence as the result of the interaction between the worlds of sedentary Iran and the northern steppes of Western Turkestan in the 2nd half of the 3rd century BC. Less than a century later, the Arsacids had become a world power. Ancient authors repeatedly testify to the affinity between the Arsacid Parthians and the nomads of the northern steppes in terms of their customs, manner of warfare, and type of dress. Significantly, several ancient authors (Trogus apud Justin, Strabo, Arrian, Curtius, and others) emphasize "the "Scythian" -- i. e. nomadic -- origin of the Arsacid empire. In order to gain a better understanding of what they meant, it is important to distinguish which nomadic elements contributed to the emergence and historical development of Arsacid Iran.
The origins of the Arsacid kingdom were closely linked with the Dahae, who migrated from Transoxiana to the frontiers of the Seleucid kingdom in the vicinity of Parthyaia and Hyrcania, where they wandered in the region of what is today southern Turkmenistan. The Dahae frequently invaded the agricultural zones of Hyrcania and Parthyaia, exacting tribute from the local population, which was an important source of their revenue. Eventually, the Aparni, a tribe in the Dahae confederacy who lived along the river Ochos (Usboi), under the leadership of a certain Arsaces, seized some of the frontier districts of northeastern Iran. Around 239-238 BC, Arsaces led the Aparni in an invasion of Parthyaia, followed a little later by the subjugation of the nearby country of Hyrcania. Seleucid attempts to regain their lost satrapies failed, enabling the Arsacids to consolidate their position in northeastern Iran.
After the conquest of Parthyaia and Hyrcania, Arsaces (I) found himself in the predicament of ruling two worlds: the nomadic Aparni and the settled population of northeastern Iran. The question about the character of socio-economic relations within the Arsacid kingdom is an extremely complex one. Apparently, the principal under which the social structure of the Arsacid heartland and of Arsacid Parthia operated was the nomadic legacy of the Aparni. The striking division of Parthian society into "freemen" and "slaves", as well as the internal division of the Parthian nobility into various ranks, can be traced back to the period when the Arsacid kingdom was established. The aristocracy of the Aparni became the ruling class in Parthia, and included within its lower ranks some of the traditional Iranian aristocracy of Parthyaia (and Hyrcania).
Parthian social structure was closely connected with the state's military organization, which was founded on nomadic practices inherited from the Aparni. The Parthian cavalry, whose reputation surpassed all others in antiquity, comprised two main fighting arms: mounted archers (hippotoxotai) and heavy cavalrymen (kataphraktoi). The hippotoxotai, initially developed on the basis of the excellent cavalry of the nomadic Dahae, were primarily drawn from the bondsmen and dependants of Parthian grandees. The origins of the Arsacid kataphraktoi are to be sought both in the milieu of the sedentary Parthians and among the Turkestan steppe tribes, including the Massagetae.
To understand properly Arsacid history it must be kept in mind that the Parthian kingdom emerged as the result of a nomadic invasion in northeastern Iran. Although tightly bound to their steppe heritage, the Arsacids showed a remarkable ability to adopt promptly and efficiently a number of the hallmarks associated with the sedentary peoples, whom they had subjugated, including the establishment of new cities, the creation of strongholds, and the introduction of a coinage system. The paper highlights the nomadic components of Arsacid Parthia in order to elucidate those features that contributed to the rise and development of Arsacid Iran. It seems that the ethos of the Arsacid Parthians - understood as the fundamental character underlaying their guiding assumptions, customs, manners and social as well as military institutions - was principally of nomadic descendance.
Migration, State and Ethnic Justice. The Case of Gurage in Ethiopia
Antonio Palmisano
(entfallen)
The Horn of Africa is the stage of wide movements of ethnic groups. The Gurage of Ethiopia are paradigmatic migrants.
The movements of an ethnic minority -be it migration or nomadism- creates problematic situations of order and disorder within "other" ethnic majorities which include it, i.e. within a State to whose formation the minority contributes. The migration implies the movement of the social actor on other stages. The different stages imply different roles for the same actors as well as specific social personalities. Different stages give thus shape to "different" personae. The same Gurage in the countryside or in town, can even have different families, different wives: he can then live in differently ordered contexts within other systems of value and orientation of the social action or within the same system of value but contextually oriented: Polytheism and Orthodox Christianism in the rural areas, Christianism and widespread Islam in town.
The very specific composition of local and interclan court of justice called yejoka, gives to the Gurage person an identity to which he can always and anyway refer, an identity which transcends the social situation countryside/ town and/or the political and religious situation, Third Confession/ Orthodox Christianism/ Islam and the corresponding identities on the specific stages. This identity is a juridical identity, namely a tribal identity sensu strictu which finds its own celebration, its epiphany in the praxis of ethnic justice contributing thus to the formation of State order.
Introductory Remarks
Jürgen Paul
The seminar "The Military and Statehood" revolves around a complex set of questions, and it is the purpose of my remarks to somehow try tosketch some of the ways in which they are connected. Some of the questions are more evident than others. Of course, there always is the question of who conquers whom, who, out of the two controversial partners, sedentary states and nomadic tribes, prevails over the other, and why this should be so in a given historical setting. This way of putting the question presupposes, however, that sedentary states and nomadic tribes are altogether different entities, and that there is some sort of pre-existent feud between them.
I think that focusing on the various forms of interaction offers a more promising perspective. What were the means employed by sedentary states to cope with the nomadic populations at their periphery, how did they respond to the military potential found in a society where military skills are well diffused? How were the military terms of coexistence on the steppe (or desert) frontier negotiated? To what extent did nomadic people retain their military independence when subordinated to a powerful sedentary empire? Does it make a difference in this respect whether the sedentary state originally developed out of nomadic roots? Detailed investigation of such and related topics should show that confrontation was only one mode of military interaction between sedentary states and nomadic peoples.
Whenever sedentary states were conquered by nomads, a twofold process seems to follow. On the one hand, the erstwhile nomads inherit - together with the financial and generally civilian bureaucracy - the military institutions of the conquered state, and even if they may reject this heritage, some of it almost certainly resurfaces. In the same vein, they also may take over the strategies developed by their predecessors for dealing with the nomads. On the other hand, the fighting force which was successful in conquering the sedentary states in question is transformed, by the conquest itself, into something it had not been before: an army if we understand this to mean an institution clearly delimitated within the social system of division of labor, and serving a state. This army may retain some of the features characterizing tribal nomad warfare, but by necessity is subject to change (regular pay, chain of command, organization).
Results obtained in the fields of European history (the role played by the military in the formation of modern states can hardy be overestimated) and social anthropology (the way military action is organized and conceptualized by present-day nomads) can yield important insights, and indeed give some of the more important cues, for all of these questions.
Ethno-Linguistic Markers of the Turco-Mongol Military and Persian Bureaucratic Castes in Pre-Modern Iran and India
John Perry
The imposition of Mongol rule on Iran (ca. 1260 CE) has rightly been regarded as a turning-point in the character and self-identity of Iran as a nation, and a forerunner of the establishment of an Iranian state from the Safavid era up until Qajar times and even beyond. Fundamental to this paradigm is the symbiosis of a ruling military elite of pastoral nomadic provenance from the Inner Asiatic steppes (hitherto of Turkic language and ethnicity) and a bureaucratic administration of urban Iranian extraction and Persian language and culture. The foundations for this were laid in Ghaznavid times and developed under the Seljuks. In post-Mongol administrations of Iran and northern India this bipartite pattern became routinized under a virtual caste system, consolidated by appeals to genealogy and other traditions, and labeled by ethno-linguistic references respectively to Turks and Persians. Attempts to cross lines under this system, as recorded in Safavid times, were often resented and resisted.
The ethno-linguistic labeling was not confined to the conventional catchphrase Turk-o Tâzîk and to Fachsprache use of Turkish and Persian, but is discernable at a subconscious level in the syntax (not, usually, the etymology) of the onomastics and titulature of the classes and individuals on each side of the professional dichotomy.
The paper will delineate the rationale of this socio-linguistic sub-system, and illustrate the ways in which it was integrated with other ethnic and professional markers and how it influenced the languages involved.
„Ei oder Henne?“ Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft im frühneuzeitlichen Europa
Michael Rogg
Der "unauflösliche Zusammenhang von Militär und Staat" (Ekkehart Krippendorf) läßt sich in der Umbruchphase zwischen dem Spätmittelalter und der Frühen Neuzeit wie durch ein Brennglas beobachten. Die tiefgreifenden Veränderungen der sogenannten "Military Revolution" sind für das Verständnis der Epoche von zentraler Bedeutung. Wenngleich die Entwicklungen, bezogen auf Zeit, Territorium und Intensität keinesfalls gleichförmig verliefen, so lassen sich doch eine Reihe paralleler Entwicklungen beobachten. Dazu gehören neben den Wandlungen in der Technik (Verbesserung der Handfeuerwaffen und der Artillerie) und in der Taktik (Ablösen der gepanzerten Reiterheere durch kompakte Infanterieverbände, bewegliche Formationen) auch die steigende Bedeutung militärischer Infrastruktur (komplexere Versorgung, Rolle der Festungen) und vor allem das enorme Anwachsen der Heeresgrößen.
Das grundlegend veränderte Kriegsbild wirkte sich auch auf die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen der Kriegführung aus. Während noch im Spätmittelalter die lehensrechtliche Heerfolge die wichtigste Form der Heeresaufbringung bildete traten zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts privatwirtschaftliche Strukturen in den Vordergrund. Die kriegführenden Landesherren mußten Militärunternehmer beauftragen mit eigenen Mitteln und nicht selten auf eigenes Risiko Truppen anzuwerben. Ein vertraglich gebundenes Dienstverhältnis band die Landsknechte und Reisläufer (= eidgenössischer Kriegsleute) oder Söldner aus anderen Regionen lediglich für eine befristete Zeit an den Kriegsherrn. War der Feldzug beendet mußten die Söldner abmustern und eine neue Beschäftigung suchen. Dieses freie Söldnerwesen war nur schwer zu kontrollieren, und beförderte die Entwicklung eigener Rechts- und Verhaltensformen, die außerhalb der obrigkeitlichen Normenvorstellung lagen (unabhängiges Militärrecht, Befreiung von Bekleidungsvorschriften, Troßgesellschaft, Promiskuität etc.).
All diese Neuerungen führten dazu, daß der Krieg nicht nur immer komplizierter sondern auch immer teurer wurde. Die Kosten für immer größere Heere, immer bessere Artillerie und immer stärkere Festungen verlangten vom frühneuzeitlichen Staat alle Kraftreserven zu mobilisieren. Die Bereitstellung ausreichender finanzieller Mittel stand dabei im Vordergrund. Im Streit um die Bewilligung, bzw. Erhöhung der Steuern gerieten die Landesherren in einen grundsätzlichen Verfassungskonflikt mit den beteiligungspflichtigen Ständen, selbst in Zeiten existentieller Not (Beispielhaft in den Türkenkriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts). Ein kurzer Ausblick wird auch zeigen, daß die Bedeutung des Militärs als auch Mittel herrschaftlicher Repräsentation eine immer wichtigere Rolle spielt (exemplarisch dargestellt an der Verknüpfung von personaler und Kriegspropaganda unter Kaiser Maximilian I.).
Waffentechnische Neuerungen und steigende Heeresgrößen führten in der Frühen Neuzeit zu einer "Rüstungsspirale" (Bernhard Kroener), die mit den traditionellen Verwaltungs- und Finanzstrukturen nicht mehr zu bewältigen war. Der Aufbau einer leistungsfähigen Bürokratie, der Bedarf an Funktionseliten in der Verwaltung und nicht zuletzt der Faktor Bildung spielten dabei eine immer größere Rolle. Gerade in diesen Bereichen läßt sich exemplarisch die wechselseitige Einflußnahme von Militär und Staat in der Frühen Neuzeit nachweisen. So sicherte beispielsweise der Verkauf von gut dotierten Stellen (sogenannten "Ämtern") dem Staat nicht nur Einkünfte sondern beförderte zugleich eine effektivere Verwaltung. Jüngere Forschungen belegen dabei eine wechselseitige Durchdringung von Militär- und Verwaltungs-laufbahn. Fiskalisierung, Funktionalisierung und nicht zuletzt Verrechtlichung sind nicht nur Schlüsselbegriffe für den Staatswerdungsprozeß im frühneuzeitlichen Europa. Sie lassen sich beispielhaft auch in der Entwicklung des Militärs der Epoche beobachten. Bei der Betrachtung von Militär und Staatlichkeit wird die immer wieder gestellten Frage von "chicken and egg" (Frank Tallett) auch in diesem Beitrag nicht beantwortet werden können. Der integrale Zusammenhang der Faktoren Militär und Staat verknüpft durch die Schnittstelle der Gesellschaft bleibt jedoch, einmal mehr für das 16. und 17. Jahrhundert, unbestritten.
Allies or Enemies? The Military Relations between the Yomut-Turkmen and the Nascent Qajar State in Late 18th and Early 19th Century Iran
Irene Schneider
In the end of the 18th, beginning 19th century in Iran the Qajar state emerged in an environment of tribal resurgence. The Qajars succeeded in building up a state which was to exist until 1925. The successes of this state-building is usually attributed to Agha Muhammad Khan's ability to manage the "tribal arithmetic". In this paper the relation between the nascent Qajar state and the nomadic tribe of Yomut (belonging to the Turkmen of Khurasan) will be looked upon. Whereas the Yomut seem to have been allies of the Qajar tribe especially in the time of Agha Muhammad Khan's father and himself, they were during the 19th century and especially at the beginning of the 20th century considered as enemies of not only the Iranian political order but also of the Iranian civilisation. It is this process of changing relations between the Qajars and the Yomut in the military, but also political and economical field, that the paper will focus upon.
Weidegebiete gegen Kriegsdienste. Zur historischen und politischen Stellung mongolischer Pastoralnomaden im Russischen Reich
Dietmar Schorkowitz
Die Begegnung der Nomaden mit dem Staat erscheint uns als ein Aufeinandertreffen zweier Welten, deren innere Verfassung unterschiedlicher kaum sein könnte. Diese Sicht der Dinge vermittelt uns jedenfalls die Perspektive der Metropolen, die ihre Zivilisation als maßgebliche Kulturleistung abbilden. Außer Acht gelassen wird dabei, daß viele Leistungen erst durch die Vermittlung nomadisch verfasster Gesellschaften angeeignet wurden. Diese bipolare Beziehung stellt sich als ein dynamischer Prozeß dar, bei dem die Gesellschaften mit Staat die Gemeinschaften der Nomaden zunehmend absorbierten.
Erst im Vergleich der frühneuzeitlichen Vielvölkerstaaten wird deutlich, daß die herangewachsenen Reiche der Osmanen, Mandschus und Romanovs sich diverse Techniken zur Subordination nichtkonformer Gesellschaftsverbände durch lange Erfahrung aneigneten. Die militärische Indienststellung der Pastoralnomaden galt dem Staat allerdings als Königsweg der Integration, weil er sich so auch deren Ökonomie zu Nutzen machen und Rahmenbedingungen für seßhafte Habitate schaffen konnte. Auf diese Weise entstanden jene für Rußland typischen Wehrsiedlungen der Kosaken, wo nomadische Gruppen ihre Traditionen bewahren konnten und sich zugleich der seßhaften Welt des russischen Staates annäherten. Wie sich dieser schwierige Akkulturationsprozeß für die Kalmücken-Ojraten gestaltete, ist Gegenstand des vorliegenden Beitrags.
Dabei ist zu verdeutlichen, wodurch sich der Integrationsverlauf dieses in der Westmongolei beheimateten Volkes auszeichnet, das schon unter Cingis Chan und erneut mit dem Dzungaren-Reich im 15.-18. Jahrhundert ausgiebig Erfahrungen mit dem Staat gemacht hatte. Hierzu werden die für das Verständnis der sozialen Organisation nötigen Konzeptionen der Gliederung von Territorium, Hierarchie und Deszendenz der Mongolen Rußlands vorgestellt. Die staatliche Integration der Kalmücken-Ojraten, die sich zu Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts an der südsibirischen Peripherie dauerhaft einzurichten begannen, setzte zwar auf Grundlage der zarischen Zusage ein, Weidegebiete gegen die Ableistung von Grenzschutz und Kriegsdiensten bei Anerkennung der Moskauer Souveränität zu überlassen. Aber mit Expansion des Reiches wandelte sich das Herrschaftsverständnis und damit auch die Integrationsstrategie (Toleranz, Assimilation, Subordination), deren verschiedene Entwicklungsstufen bis in die frühe Sowjetzeit untersucht wird.
Mercenaries and City-Rulers. Early Turks in Pre-Muslim Transoxania
Sören Stark
Political interactions between the agricultural oasis states in Transoxania and the open steppes increased distinctively since the second half of the 6th century, when the Türk Qaganat (and its western successors) succeded to establish a more or less direct controll over most of the pre-muslim minor states in Transoxania.
During the next 150 years two distinctive levels of close political, economic and cultural interaction between 'Sogdians' (to summarize the complex political landscape according to a prevailing cultural unity of pre-muslim Transoxania) and the sphere of nomads in the open steppes and in the closer vicinity of the oasis centers can be observed: on the one hand the 'imperial level', i.e. interactions between Sogdian princes, merchants and diplomates and the Türk qagans and their apparatus (centered in presentday Mongolia and in the northern foothills of the Tianshan), and on the other hand a 'local level' on the scale of the more or less autonomous Sogdian principality. While the 'imperial level' has been studied for a long time, the 'locale dimension' still remains unsufficiently explored in many aspects.
A close examination of all available sources (literary, epigraphical, numismatic and archaeological) reveals the presence of 'Turks' in many Transoxanian minor states. Surprisingly, they frequently act as members of the elite and even as city rulers. It is unclear to which extent these early turkish minor potentates depended directly on 'imperial' support. Considering that single warlords were able to usurp power in Transoxanian city-states for many years and that independent, i. e. 'non imperial' turkish contingents in the service of various Sogdian principalities were frequently mentioned their origin might have been that of 'condottieri', based upon a personal retinue. It is precisely this typ of a 'nomadic' war-and-robber-band (see the turko-nomadic custom described as qazaqliq in post-mongol times) which seems to be closely related to the cakar-typ guard corps, widespread in pre-muslim Transoxania. Such personal retinues and their military and social aspects can obviously be seen as a close link between the Sogdian aristocracy and the nomadic sphere.
