MONGOL ARISTOCRATS AND BEYLİKS IN ANATOLIA.
A STUDY OF ASTARĀBĀDĪ’S BAZM VA RAZM*

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Abstract
This paper is about beyliks – political entities that include at least one town (or a major fortress or both), its agricultural hinterland and a (large) amounts of pasture. It is also about Mongols in Anatolia in the beylik period (in particular the second half of the 14th century) and their leading families some of whom are presented in detail. The paper argues that the Eretna sultanate, the Mongol successor state in Anatolia, underwent a drawn-out fission process which resulted in a number of beyliks. Out of this number, at least one beylik had Mongol leaders. Besides, the paper argues that Mongols and their leading families were much more important in this period than had earlier been assumed.

Large parts of Anatolia came under Mongol rule earlier than western Iran. The Mongols had won a resounding victory over the Rum Seljuqs at Köse Dağ in 1243, and Mongols then started occupying winter and summer pastures in Central and Eastern Anatolia, pushing the Turks and Türkmens to the West and towards the coastal mountain ranges. Later, Mongol Anatolia became part of the Ilkhanate, and this province was one of the focal points of Ilkhanid politics and intrigues.¹ The first troops, allegedly three tümen, had already been dispatched to Anatolia by

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Ögödei, and their number increased over the next decades.\(^2\) (Melville gives a much lower estimate of the first Mongol troops in Anatolia.)\(^3\) They occupied vast stretches of steppe land in Central Anatolia, with winter pastures concentrated to the east of Tuz Gölü, among other places, and summer camps in the Taurus mountains; these at least are the arrangements that are relevant for the setting in the source under study.

The earlier periods of Mongol presence in Anatolia have received a relatively fair amount of scholarly attention. One of the contexts is the history of the Ilkhanid empire, where Anatolia is, however, relegated to a more or less marginal position as the standard accounts of the Ilkhanid empire do not devote much space to Anatolia.\(^4\) Another context is the rise of the Ottoman state in northwestern Anatolia, and then the question is often why this particular beylik turned into one of the most remarkable empires in European as well as Near Eastern history.\(^5\) The Anatolian beyliks of the fourteenth century often appear in this context as something that must be overcome by more centralised and hence more powerful structures. Anatolian history is then narrated with hindsight, with the Ottoman Empire as its telos; this is a debatable approach, even though the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia certainly did mark a watershed in the late medieval history of the region,\(^6\) and Darling is quite justified in bringing


\(^4\) The *Cambridge History of Iran* does not even mention Eretna, and the article on “Asia Minor” in the *Elr* is all about antiquity. The online version of the *Elr* has an entry on the “Saljuqs of Rum”, which describes the fission processes very well (Peacock, “Saljuqs iii”, see also Peacock, Andrew C.S., “Nomadic society and the Seljūq campaigns in Caucasia”, *Iran and the Caucasus*, IX/2 [2005]: pp. 205-30), but of course does not reach beyond the very first years of the fourteenth century. The Eretna sultanate is not well served in beylik studies either. Thus, the map in Lindner (Lindner, Rudi Paul, “Anatolia, 1300-1451”, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, I, *Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453*, ed. Kate Fleet [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009]: pp. 102-37) has a politically empty space in Central Anatolia.


this approach into question. Melville says that the period between the collapse of the Ilkhanid state and the rise of the Ottomans often is treated “like a brief preamble to the rise of the Ottomans” or even as an “unwelcome interlude” in the history of Turkish state-building, and this is also the impression of the present writer.

7 Darling, “Persianate sources”.
Anatolian beyliks originated as a result of a double fission process. First, it was the Rûm Seljuq sultanate that dissolved, until it finally ended around 1300 after having been a client state of the Mongols for some decades.9 The Ilkhanate in turn broke up after 1335 (to have a handy date; in fact, as Melville has shown,10 internal dissent had grown during the reign of Abū Saʿīd [1315-35]). Central Anatolia, the heart of Mongol rule, was transformed into the Eretna sultanate, which in turn fell apart after Eretna’s death in 1352. Major centres of power were the main cities: Amasya, Erzincan, Kayseri, Konya, Sivas; smaller beyliks formed too, around Niksar, Tokat, and other places. For the mid-fourteenth century, Bosworth has around 20 statelets in Anatolia, including areas outside the Eretna domains,11 and as we shall see, his list is not complete.

The chapter devoted to the beylik period in the Cambridge History of Turkey is organised around the question of why the beyliks did not last, or, the other way round: why was it the Ottomans who succeeded in the long run?12 Consequently, the beyliks themselves are not treated in much detail. Lindner also sees a fission process at work, which he describes with regard to many beyliks. One factor behind these fission processes is the kind of family rule well known from other Turkic dynasties; another is the comparative paucity of resources and the difficulty of making the transition from nomadic to ‘sedentary’ warfare.

As a result of these fission processes, the imperial level of political rule was absent in Anatolia from the end of effective Ilkhanid rule, and was not re-established on a firm basis until the final conquest of the region by the Ottomans in the second half of the fifteenth century. The absence of the imperial level of political rule makes the regional and local levels emerge more distinctly than would normally be expected – if there are sources that follow the regionalist trend. Astarābādī’s Bazm va Razm, devoted to the life and rule of Burhān al-Dīn Aḥmad (ruled at Sivas from 1381 to 1398) is such a source.13 It provides insight into the local level of domination, local

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10 Melville, Fall of Amir Chupan.
12 Lindner, “Anatolia”.
13 For a more detailed appreciation of this source, see Paul, Jürgen, “A landscape of fortresses”, David Durand-Guédy (ed.), Turko-Mongol Rulers, Cities and City Life (Leiden: Brill, 2012 forthcoming). Briefly, the work is about the life, career and worldview of qāż Burhān al-Dīn Aḥmad from Kayseri, who later ruled over at least part of the Eretnid sultanate. The narrative breaks off a little earlier, around 1397, and
lordship, local power holders and their dealings with regional and sometimes even imperial rulers, which are not possible or at least are much more difficult to obtain in other texts. The methodological premise is that we can learn more about local lordship in ‘untidy’ situations than we could otherwise.

The basic building block in the spatial organisation of power seems to have been a complex including at least one town (or fortress or both), an expanse of agricultural hinterland, and sufficient pasture. This complex is somehow the ‘minimal or basic beylik’ – all the essential resources are in place, even if they often are not plentiful. This political structure can be detected in many Mongol and post-Mongol states. Beatrice Manz has described the situation in the \textit{ulūs Çağatay} before Timur’s rise to power; she states that “the various groups within the Ulus had made themselves independent under their own chiefs”,\textsuperscript{14} which she then goes on to enumerate.\textsuperscript{15} All these regional structures included at least one town, its agricultural hinterland and an amount of pasture.

In Turkey, there seems to be a certain kind of ‘beylik monograph’ with a given conventional structure. The known rulers of the beylik in question are presented in chronological order; the battles they fought, the territory they occupied and related questions are chief subjects. In another chapter, their relationships with neighbouring beyliks are explored, and there is often also a chapter on their patronage of scholars and artists, as well as on their building activities – some of the mosques and medreses they commissioned are still standing and sometimes they are major sites of interest.

A main question in Turkish historiography of the beylik period has been and continues to be the ethnic background of beylik leaders. Authors find it important to ascertain their Turkishness; the beylik period is rightly regarded as a pivotal moment in the Turkification of Anatolia.\textsuperscript{16} Much

\textsuperscript{14} Manz, Beatrice, \textit{The rise and rule of Tamerlane} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): p. 27.

\textsuperscript{15} Manz is using tribalism as a basic concept here; she also names the leading persons and families for each of the small beylik-type dominions. There are about ten such complexes in the south-western half of the \textit{ulūs} that was the framework for Timur’s early career. Each of them comprises a city, an oasis and vast pasturelands. Manz also draws attention to the fact that the population in the \textit{ulūs} and its component parts was very mixed even if “the nomads held decisive political power” (ibid.: p. 21).

\textsuperscript{16} Relevant examples of this approach are: Yücel, Yaşar, \textit{Anadolu Beylikleri Hakkında Araştırmalar: Eratna Devri; Kadi Burhaneddin Ahmed ve Devleti; Mutahharten ve

the book was probably written shortly after. In places, the narrative uses devices known from hagiography, and legitimisation issues are discussed at length. The style is literate and ornate. The source will be referred to as BR.
more has been written on the western beyliks because their relationship with the early Ottoman state is better documented.17

It seems to me that there are at least two serious drawbacks here. The first is that the beylik as a territorial state is taken for granted. In this article, it will be shown in the discussion of who ruled at Kayseri in the period covered in Astarābādī’s Bazm va Razm (roughly 1370-97) that there were not only contested territories, to the point that some lands, and not only marginal ones, came close to being a kind of no-man’s-land, but that it was by no means clear what was meant by a given stretch of land, a city and its hinterland, ‘belonging’ to a given beylik and its ruler. Another point is the serious reduction in the set and type of people who had an active role in Anatolian history in the given period. Agency tends to rest with only the rulers and other state-related figures such as viziers and governors. Since these are the people whose actions the sources narrate, an approach that is so close to the texts as to be, at places, not much more than an abridged rendering of the source narrative, will always run the risk of reproducing this vision of things. In this article, it will be demonstrated that the group called ‘Mongol tribes’ played a much more active role than has been implied in previous research. Mongol emirs functioned as local lords in many places.

Schamiloğlu has suggested that the Black Death afflicted Anatolia from the middle of the fourteenth century.18 Evidence for this in the sources used in this study is clear enough (although not in BR and not in the Ottoman sources), but the markedly high importance of nomads in politics and the military may ultimately be related to depopulation (if it is true that nomads are less affected by contagious diseases than agriculturists and urbanites; in our case, the sources would suggest otherwise).19

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17 For a readable and accessible introduction, see the relevant chapters in Koca, Salim, The Turks, ed. Hasan Celâl Güzel, vol. 2: Middle Ages, Ankara (Yeni Türkiye: 2002), 507-53. See also Lindner, “Anatolia”.


19 Al-Ahrī mentions the outbreak of the plague in Azerbaijan in 747/1347 (al-Ahrī, Abū Bakr al-Quṭbī (1954) Ṭū rīkh-i Shaikh Uwais. An important source for the history of ʿĀdharbaijān in the fourteenth century, ed. and trans. J.B. van Loon (‘S-Gravenhage: Excelsior, 1954): p. 173 (Persian text); p. 73 (English trans.); Maqrūzī makes the following statement: ‘The plague spread over the entire lands of the Karaman and Kayseri and all the mountains and districts there. The people in these countries died
Coming to the Mongols of Anatolia, some research has also been done on them in particular. First, one needs to mention Faruk Sümer’s (almost) book-length study. Sümer sets out to demonstrate the superiority of Turks over Mongols in state-construction and claims that the Mongols never founded even the smallest beylik. In his view, this is due to the fact that the Mongols, even though they had converted to Islam and had stayed in the region for some generations, still were so close to their Inner Asian traditions of tribal warfare and plunder that they simply could not find out how to go about state-building. Instead, they chose to follow the strongest power around. The tribal organisation of the Mongols is, of course, taken for granted, and of course the tribal character of Türkmen society too is sometimes stressed, but in the Mongol case, it seems self-evident that Mongols are unable to overcome the limits of tribalism by themselves.

Sümer’s study continues to be quite influential down to the present day. For instance, his statement about the boys who came to power after Muḥammad b. Eretna’s death in 767/1366 is quoted almost verbatim by both Yücel and Göde (see below). Gül basically agrees with Sümer’s analysis, even if his book seems to show the contrary: There was a Mongol-run beylik (even if not called thus) in the region of Diyarbakır, a structure which might be called the Sütaylı beylik which can be traced from Sütay noyan (d. 732/1332) until a point one or two generations later.

In some works, there is a clear tendency to underestimate the Mongols and their military potential. In Göde, the discussion of the military structure of the Eretna sultanate takes up just one-and-a-half pages. About the Mongols, we read: “According to what we can glean from the sources, the army of the Eretna sultanate was made up from the mounted and infantry together with their beasts of burden and mounts and herded animals. The Kurds fled (or: nomadised away) for fear of death, but everywhere they went, the land was full of corpses. So they came back to their country and all of them died” (‘amma al-wabā’ bilād garamān wa-qayṣariyya wa-jami’i jihālihā wa-a mālihā aḥlahā wa-dawābbuhum wa-mawāṣiyruhum fa-raḥilat al-akrād ḥawfān min al-mawt fa-lam yajidū arḍān ʾilā wa-fihā al-mawtī fa-ʿādā ilā ardihiqm wa-mātā jamīʾ an) (Maqrīzī, Ṭāhir, Kitaḥ b. Mīʿarifat duval al-mulāk, ed. Muhammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, IV-VI (juz’ 2, qism 1-3) (Kairo: Kulliyāt al-Qāhir, 1958): p. 774 sub anno 749.

21 Ibid.: p. 120.
22 Gül, Muammer, XIII. ve XIV. Yüzyıllarda Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu’da Moğol Hakimiyeti (İstanbul: Çağaloğlu, 2005): pp. 127-44; see below note 134.
soldiers of the Sultan, the vassal (feudal) forces of the begs, the Mongol tribal forces called çerik, and of auxiliary troops called on for particular campaigns. This clearly does not do justice to the situation, and my thesis is that even in the last decades of the Eretna dynasty (after the death of Eretna himself in 1352 until the takeover of Qāżī Burhān al-Dīn Āḥmad in 1381), the importance of the Mongols was much greater than that. The thesis is that the Mongols were important not only as military allies, to be drawn on as a reserve where competing non-Mongol emirs could recruit military manpower, but also as a political force in their own right. They had their own agenda, and they had ways of securing their particular interests, primarily access to pasture and migration routes but also, beyond that, control of more extensive territories, including fortresses and cities with their agricultural hinterland. It seems that they were not, or at least did not see themselves as being, in a subordinate position and some Mongol political structures can be detected that are reminiscent of other such structures in other parts of the erstwhile Ilkhanate, such as the Ja‘uni Qurban in western Khurasan. Mongol local and perhaps regional lords and the way they interacted with their better-known counterparts, the rulers of the Central Anatolian beyliks, are therefore the subject of the present article.

The article will proceed as follows: First, it will address the question of whether the Anatolian Mongols were tribally organised. This section therefore evolves around a discussion of the internal constitution of Mongol groups as evident from the source under study. At the same time, this discussion lays the foundation for the second section, where some leading figures are presented together with their family backgrounds. These are the men who play an active role in Central Anatolian politics in the period under study, mobilising major fighting forces. It is thus these Mongol leaders who decide who wins and who loses in the succession struggle in the Eretna sultanate around 1380. Eretnid legitimation was clearly an important issue, and Burhān al-Dīn evidently had problems in establishing his rule as legitimate. After some years, however, this problem seems to have been settled, and in the following (third) section, the article

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25 The basic dates for the Eretna sultanate are: Eretna d. 1352; Muḥammad Beg b. Eretna, d. 1366; ʿAlī Beg b. Muḥammad, d. 1380; Muḥammad Ṭelebi b. ʿAlī Beg, d. probably 1390. Burhān al-Dīn first was vizier and nāʾib (regent) for ʿAlī Beg until he took over, possibly not entirely without recognising the right of the infant Muḥammad Ṭelebi, in 1381. He ruled until 1398, when he was killed by an Akkoyunlu leader. Astarābādī’s narrative does not reach quite this point but breaks off shortly before.
presents examples of cooperation between Burhān al-Dīn and at least some of the Mongol leaders. The political and military objectives of this cooperation are defined in no small measure by the Mongols. Securing pasture emerges as an essential aim. The Mongols, Burhān al-Dīn’s allies, see their pasture rights disputed by two competitors in particular: first, the ‘Syrian Türkmen’, and second, the ‘son of ʿUmar’, the lord of Kayseri, called Junaid. The latter is presented in the following (fourth) section, which is devoted to Kayseri, and a possible affiliation is discussed. But apart from the affiliation problem, it emerges that Junaid was the lord of a Mongol ‘beylik’ centred on Kayseri and based on a Mongol group who were not only rivals, but sometimes bitter enemies of the Mongols who had allied themselves to Burhān al-Dīn. Moreover, the source claims that Kayseri urban notables were opposed to Junaid and worked for Burhān al-Dīn instead. On the other hand, the cooperation between the Mongol emirs and Burhān al-Dīn was close enough to think of the Sivas sultanate as a joint dominion in which the Mongol emirs were vassals as well as partners of the sultan. Finally, the article will consider the loci of power: Towards the end of the book, Burhān al-Dīn is said sometimes to have joined nomads in their migration to the summer grazing grounds. Did he make a transition to ‘ruling from the outside’ that was typical of nomadic rule in the Turco-Iranian world? Earlier, the Mongols had apparently insisted on the Eretnid sultan ʿAlī Beg moving around with them. While Kayseri was an example of imposed Mongol rule, Sivas seems to have evolved towards joint rule by Mongol elite families and an originally urban-based political figure.

**Were the Anatolian Mongols tribally organised?**

In Astarābādī, there are a number of names for Mongols. Some of them seem to be names for tribal groups of various sizes, some of them large enough to qualify as confederations, such as the Ṣamāḡār, the Bārambāy, the Jaɣgāzān and the Jáwunqār. A smaller group, said to be a part of the Bārambāy, were the Alagöz. Some of the names seem to refer to larger groups: *tatar* and *mugūl*. And finally, there is the concept of *ulūs*. It is with this term that we start the investigation.

*Ulūs* is used in this source mostly, but not exclusively, for Mongol groups. In one case, the term is used for the Mongols who follow ʿAlī Beg (BR 172). We shall see an example of the term including Turks below. Another exception occurs towards the end of the book: after the conquest of Giresun (in 1397,26 the man behind the conquest was one of Burhān al-

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26 Demir, Hacemiroğulları Beyliği: p. 77.
Dīn’s vassals, Sulaimān Beg of the Hacıemiroğulları, received congratulations from the Mamluk sultan in Cairo in a letter by which the Syrian Türkmen are put under Burhān al-Dīn’s command, and are ordered to summer and winter with him.

I have not been able to ascertain whether the groups known by the names quoted above were part of the ulūs or whether they formed ulūs-like groups of their own. This is complicated by the fact that the names for Mongol groups do not appear in the second half or so of the book, after Burhān al-Dīn had taken over the sultanate. If the ulūs emirs were a category excluding the Şamâqâr, the Bârāmbây and the other groups, it would seem natural to retain these names all through. I would therefore suggest that the ulūs emirs were those who represented and led (in battle at least) the groups who arrived in Anatolia during and after the Mongol conquest and therefore had at some point been part of the Mongol army. Pastoralists residing in Central and Eastern Anatolia earlier than that are probably not included in this meaning of ulūs.

Another meaning of the term is apparently: an ulūs is formed by mostly pastoralist groups who accept a given person as their lord or overlord, without any further specification as to historical or ethnic background. In that case, the ulūs emirs would be those men, mostly leaders of Mongol pastoralists, but also Türkmen and others, who after some hesitation chose more or less consistently to support Burhān al-Dīn.

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27 See Paul, “Landscape”.

28 wa kâffâ-ya ahšâm-i tarâkima-yi Šâm bâ ḥânahâ wa ḥavâšî wa mawâšî dar șaif wa šitâ rîqâlat wa nazûl bâ ü kunand wa mis jamî’ al-wujûh muft-i anr wa tisârat-i bažrat bâsând [...] wa ilcî cîn in rîsâlat ba-mahall-i ‘arz risâniq sulfân-râ dâ ṭâya-yi nahzat ba-ṣaub-i yailâq wa jam’ miyân-i juyâs wa junûd-i har dû ulûs ziyâdat šud (“And all the Syrian Türkmen warriors and nomads, together with their tents and families and flocks, in summer as well as in winter, should move and pitch camp together with him, and should in every respect obey every order of His Highness. [...] And when the envoy had expounded this message, the Sultan [Burhān al-Dīn] was even more desirous to break camp and to move on to the summer pastures and to bring about the union of the troops and warriors of both the ulûses”) (Astarâbâdî, ‘Azîz b. Ardaşîr Bazm va Razm, ed. K. Rifat [İstanbul: Evkaf Matbaasî, 1928]: 530). It seems fair to understand the “two ulûses” as denoting the Mongol nomads on the one hand and the “Syrian Türkmen” on the other. Note also how the seasonal migrations acquire a religious sanction by the evident allusion to Qur’ân 106 (Qurayş) with its reference to the rîqâlat al-šitâ wa-alaṣaf, the “summer and the winter journey”.

29 See also Doerfer, Gerhard, Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen, Vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1963): § 54. (Doerfer is quoted by numbers, not by pages.)
The origins of at least two of the names quoted above are well known. The group called Ṣamāġār in Astarābādī is linked to Ṣamāġār noyan, an important leader of the Mongol army in Anatolia. He was present in the region early on, at least since around 1272, when the Ilkhan Abaqa sent troops westwards to prevent an intervention by the Egyptian-Syrian mamluks. He held important positions: he sometimes served as commander-in-chief of the Mongol troops in Anatolia, and was one of the Mongol leaders present when Emir Caca of Kırşehir had his famous endowment deed certified. His prominent position is indicated by the fact that some of his retainers (nökers) were asked to sign as well. He was a Tatar by tribal affiliation, but the sources apparently do not give any more detailed information about his ancestral background.

The Bārambāy (likewise with numerous readings) are in turn linked to another Mongol leader, Bārambāy b. Sütay, a member of the Sütay house of governors or begs in Diyarbakır, whose representative in the twilight of the Ilkhanate was Ḥājjī Tağai b. Sütay. At some point shortly after the demise of Abū Sa‘īd Khan, an important fraction of the Mongols in Diyarbakır left that region for Central Anatolia and came to serve the Eretna dynasty. The house of Sütay is said to belong to the Sünit genealogical group. There was apparently some internal strife within the family since sources report that Ibrāhīmšāh b. Bārambāy killed his uncle Ḥājjī Tağai in 744/1343-4.

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30 Numerous variant readings of the form; here, as with Bārambāy and in other cases, I use the spelling which the edition uses.
35 Tatar is not a tribe, of course; even if we assume that the Mongols in Inner Asia were tribally organised, the group called Tatar is much too large and would then be a confederation rather than a tribe. Moreover, tatar was one of the catch-all terms used to refer to all those who came during and after the Mongol or Tatar, invasion.
36 Gül, XIII. ve XIV. Yüzyıllarda.
37 Melville, Fall of Amir Chupan.
38 Gül, XIII. ve XIV. Yüzyıllarda: p. 165.
So far, I have been unable to trace a parallel explanation for the third ‘tribal’ name, the Jäygäzän, or for Alagöz.

The Jäwunqär are mentioned less frequently. The name means ‘left wing’ (of the Mongol army according to the Mongol system of dividing an army on the battlefield). They were located in a more northerly region. The Şamâqâr and the Bârâmây both appear most frequently in a region between Kayseri, Kırşehir, Niğde and perhaps the Taurus mountain range (towards Malatya); there is little information on how far west they extended, but they were certainly to be found on Karaman territory as well, probably as far west as Beşeyhir and Ilgın. The Jäwunqär, on the other hand, are seen once in an alliance with the emir of Amasya, whom they left, however, in order to join Burhân al-Dîn. One of their leaders, Gözler, is quoted as being one of the most important emirs around 1380 when the succession struggle was at its highest point. Yücel also puts this group in the Yozgat-Amasya-Tokat region where they apparently played an important role until they were defeated by the Ottoman sultan Mehmed I.

There are two arguments for the proposition that neither the Şamâqâr nor the Bârâmây were a ‘tribe’, if we understand a tribe to be a group based on a real or constructed genealogy which made it possible to trace the living members of the tribe to one common ancestor, who would therefore be a biological or cultural point of reference, or both. The first argument is that the two groups were known by a name whose original bearer was by no means a distant ancestor, but lived just a few generations earlier. The biological descendants of that person could therefore not be as numerous as the Şamâqâr and the Bârâmây both appear to be in the source under study. Both names should therefore be understood to be

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40 Astarâbâdî, Bazm va Razm: p. 279.
41 Ibid.: pp. 311-2.
42 Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 89, n. 8.
43 Sneath, David, The headless state: Aristocratic orders, kinship society and misrepresentations of nomadic inner Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). This is hardly the place to re-address the problem of what a tribe is. Shahin Mustafayev introduced me to the following view: A tribe is a group of people, not necessarily related by kinship, but mostly pastoralist, who hold winter and summer pastures in common and are bound mainly by the mutual obligation to defend these pastures together. In sub-groups of a tribe, kinship ties are more important. (Personal communication, email message, 20 February 2011. In Mustafayev’s message, tribe is [Russian] plemya, and the sub-groups are called rod.) I think this view is refreshing because it separates kinship and socio-economic issues to a very high degree. My own reading of the sources would confirm that view. In Mustafayev’s understanding, therefore, the Mongols in Anatolia were tribal. This does not, of course, contradict my statement that they were not.
‘political’ names, denoting the military and political following of the eponymous ‘founder’ of the group and his descendants. We do not know whether these followers were in any way genealogically related to the leading family; neither do we know whether there were genealogical ties between these followers themselves. What we have here, then, is an example of a larger group known by the name of a leading figure from the not too distant past, whose descendants continued to assume leadership of the larger group. It is not relevant for the purpose of this article to decide whether these families could be called ‘aristocratic’; what is evident, though, is that there is no traceable genealogical tie, real or imagined, between the leading family and its followers.44 It should also be mentioned that there were no Činggisids living permanently in Anatolia, and Činggisid leadership was no longer available after the death of Abū Saʿīd.

The second argument is related to the origins of at least part of the Mongol population in Anatolia.45 One report shows that at least part of the Mongol population in Anatolia came there as tamma troops, and the source also explains what tamma troops were: new army corps within the Mongol decimal system created by delegating a quota out of existing corps. The decimal system was vigorously and explicitly not genealogical, and it was a privilege if descent groups could stay together in decimal army corps46. This argument is also valid for the Jāwunqār: it is quite evident that a group known as ‘the Left Wing’ originated within the Mongol military system and not through a shared genealogy; we do not know, however,
whether this ‘Left Wing’ was composed of groups who, in turn, had a
genealogical basis.

There are parallels in Ilkhanid history for the sending of tamma troops,
which then resulted in the emergence of a new politically relevant and even
vigorous group. One of these examples is the Jaʿuni Qurban in western
Khūrāsān; they are presented here in some detail because of the
paradigmatic quality of their case. The name is derived from Mongolian
“three out of one hundred”, and the group originally was a “lesser
thousand” created by delegating three warriors out of a given number of
hundreds. In this case, again, we have a leading family, related to the Oirat
‘confederation’, whose history we can retrace over 150 years, or sometimes
more, and large groups of followers who, given their origins in the decimal
military system, had hardly any agnatic relations among them. The Jaʿuni
Qurban were able to play a major role in Khūrāsān between the end of the
Ilkhanate and Timur’s conquest (in fact, throughout most of the fourteenth
century). They had a politico-military centre at the fortress of Kalāt-i Tūs
(which one would nevertheless hesitate to call a capital), and they are
remarkable for their insistence on Činggisid legitimacy: they opted for
Ṭogay Temūr, who was descended from Činggis’ brother Joči Qasar, as long
as he was alive, and later transferred their support to his descendants. Timur
had them displaced at some point, and they were transferred to the eastern
frontier of the Timurid realm. After Timur’s death, they stayed with Ḥallīl
Sūltān for a while, but soon left him. Reports see them later supporting
Ṭogay Temūr’s grandson Pīr Pādišāh in a short-lived bid for power.

Supporting Ṭogay Temūr also seems to have been an option in
Anatolia: for a short while, Eretna had coins minted in the name of this
‘ilkan’. Remler sees a sign of Anatolian political independence here and
points to the “continuity of the economic links across the silk route”. It
appears to me that there was an undercurrent of ‘legitimist’ feelings for
this pretender (who was a ‘collateral Činggisid’ not being a direct
descendant of the great conqueror, but still part of the Činggisid

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47 Paul, Jürgen, “Who makes use of whom? Some remarks on the nomad policy of the
Khwārazmshāhs (1150-1200)”, in Nomadic military power: Iran and adjacent areas in
the Islamic period, ed. K. Franz and W. Holzwarth (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2010,
pp. 95-117.
48 Aubin, “La fin de l’état”.
49 Remler, Philip, “Ottoman, Isfendiyarid, and Eretnid coinage: A currency community
in fourteenth-century Anatolia”, The American Numismatic Society Museum Notes, 25
50 Ibid.: p. 172.
dispensation), and that he was therefore attractive to such groups as the Mongols under Eretna and the Jaʿuni Qurban alike. Eretna, however, dropped this ‘legitimist’ stance after only a couple of years, whereas the feeling that a Činggisid head (or figurehead, even if only a collateral one) was needed lingered on in Khurasan.

We would not know very much about the Jaʿuni Qurban after the end of the Ilkhanate but for one source, Faryūmadī. He is the only one to give a narrative, however short, of the leading family ‘from within’, rather than just snippets of information embedded in stories about other dynasties and rulers. For the Mongols of Central Anatolia after the fall of the Ilkhanate, there is no such source, and the role and the status of the Mongols in Anatolia has therefore to be reconstructed from sources whose authors viewed the Mongols from the outside.

The Jaʿuni Qurban controlled a relatively large territory which included not only pasture, but also agricultural land and towns such as Ṭūs, but given the importance attached to animals in reports about them, there can be little doubt that pastoral nomadism played an important role in their economy. In addition to the size of the territory, the comparative stability of their rule, and the complexity of the economy, there was political leadership vested in a given family. This family had around it a number of followers, retainers, allies and vassals, and had to maintain a military force large enough to keep the system going. Taken together, it could be argued that this was a kind of state (if we do not use maximalist definitions). Processes of fission within the leading family are detectable early on and resurfaced whenever a new generation took over. The Jaʿuni Qurban realm was larger than the ‘basic beylik’ but, as stated above, it underwent fission processes.

To conclude this section: neither the Jaʿuni Qurban (nor other groups in Iran proper and in Central Asia) nor the Mongol groups in Anatolia that our source calls Ṣamāḡār and Bārāmbāy can be said to have been ‘tribal’ since they originated within the Mongol decimal system of military organisation. We cannot be sure, however, about other Mongol groups where the link to a leading political and military figure active just a few generations earlier, in the late thirteenth or the early fourteenth century, cannot (yet) be established. The political structure, however, is clear enough: leading families were exerting authority or even ruling over

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complex populations, not only Mongols and pastoral nomads, but also agriculturalists and even townspeople. Towns were one of the most important sources of income, because trade and crafts (as well as a resident non-Muslim population) could be taxed (in cash) much more easily than agriculture. On the other hand, it has been argued that even at the height of Ilkhanid power in Iran (including Anatolia), Mongol warriors were not paid as much as Tajik fortress garrisons, and this can then be related to disturbances in the countryside because the Mongol cavalrmen tried to make up for their low pay. Whatever that may mean for Eretnid and post-Eretnid Anatolia, it is clear that a mix of resources was needed to sustain even the ‘basic beylik’, and a fortiori a more complex realm.

What should we call such a realm? Is it a principality, a chieftain, a regional state, or a tribal confederation? What difference is there between the Ja’uni Qurban state (or quasi-state or whatever) in western Khurasan and the Anatolian beyliks? We have a lordly family (in the case of the Ja’uni Qurban, with a background in the Mongol decimal organisation of the military) that dominates a comparatively large territory inhabited by all kinds of people, enjoys relative stability of rule (but is subject to internal fission), allies itself to outside powers, often much more powerful than itself, often in order to reach a decision in internal strife, but is incapable of making a transition to a conquest state. The lordly family rules through a network of personalised relationships of alliance, sometimes vassality, and is able to maintain a military force, which allows a degree of sustainability in the face of polities of the same kind all around. I admit that I opt for avoiding the question in the context of this article by calling these structures ‘beylik’.53

One of the main features of this line of research is that the boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ become blurred as soon as we get down to questions of local lordship, and domination ‘on the ground’. Therefore, even if the differences between, on the one hand, a ‘basic beylik’ or a structure just a little larger and more complex than the ‘basic beylik’, and, on the other, established regional states such as the Karaman beylik are

52 Ibid.: pp. 171-3. Garrisons are not necessarily non-Mongol or non-Türkmen in post-Mongol Anatolia, and it can be surmised that the term “Tajik” in Remler’s source (an accounting manual) is not “ethnic” either, but denotes a “non-nomadic” group of people.

53 This is not the place to re-engage in a discussion about tribes and the state. For a position that sits well with the material presented in this paper, see Bradburd, Daniel, “The influence of pastoral nomad populations on the economy and society of post-Safavid Iran”, in Nomads in the Sedentary World, ed. Anatoly Khazanov and André Wink (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001): pp. 128-51.
indeed evident, the same term is used for both. It could be argued that the larger and more complex structures are often composite, falling apart in fission processes whose final product comes close to the ‘minimal’ or ‘basic beylik’.

Leading families

In this section, some leading families of the Mongol groups mentioned in Astarābād will be presented. The aim is to show that these families were relatively stable, and can be traced over a number of generations (for up to over a century). They held a number of military commands or served as governors over larger provinces. Some of the ‘founding fathers’ can be shown to have come to Anatolia as military commanders in the mid-thirteenth century and to have occupied leading positions ever since. In some cases, at least one branch of the family holds a hereditary position, while in others, hereditary succession to a given position is harder to prove. In any case, it is members of these families who at given moments are candidates for local or even regional lordship.

The Bābūq family (Babukoğulları, Babukhanoğulları in Turkish texts)

This family can be traced over three generations, but there is very little to say about the ancestor, one Tuğay Temür, and it is not clear whether there was a ‘founding father’ in the days of conquest. Bābūq, his son, is the first to gain some prominence in the sources, and he was active some time before the account in Bazm va Razm sets in, probably around the middle of 1335 Iran. Togan does not quote a source for his claim that one Tuğay Temür had coins minted in his name in various Anatolian cities (Togan, Ahmet Zeki Validi, “Mogollar Devrinde Anadolu’nun iktisadî vaziyeti”, Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası, 1 (1931): pp. 1-42 (33); translated in Togan, Ahmet Zeki Validi, “Economic conditions in Anatolia in the Mongol period”, trans. Gary Leiser, Annales Islamologiques, 25 (1991): pp. 203-40 (233). There is a mistake in Leiser’s translation: “Togha-Temür” is not seen as “the Bey of Erdene in Anatolia” in Togan’s original: Anadolu’nun muhtelif şehirlerinde namına sikke darbolunan Tuğatmur-Han’, Anadolu'da Erdene-Bey'in tesadüf eden bu kayıt şayanı dikkattir. Erdene-Bey is evidently Eretna. Sümer also rejects the possibility that there might be a link between Bābūq’s father and the coeval ‘Ilkhan’ (Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”: p. 117). As noted above, there are indeed coins struck under Eretna in the name of the ‘Ilkhan’ Tuğay Temür, dated 739 (1338-9), but this of course does not mean that this man ruled in Central Anatolia in any practical way or even went there at all (Remler, “Ottoman, Isfendiyarid, and Eretnid coinage”: pp. 171-2).
the fourteenth century. In Şikari, he is consistently linked to Niğde, where the Karamanoğlu, the heroes of this very peculiar source, set him up as governor time and again.55

The regional principle is very clear in Şikari. Other Mongol emirs got other towns together with their regions, for instance Beyschlor, Işaklı and Ilgm.56 Eretna is more than once styled as beg of Kayseri.57

Most of the time, Şikari calls the man who appears as Bābūq in BR ‘Babukhan’, but this source uses the title han without a particularly technical meaning; in a Mongol context, only a Činggisid would have the right to use it, and the Babukhanosulları were clearly no Činggisids. Nevertheless, the use of the title might still be indicative of a leading position.

Bābūq is remembered as a very powerful figure indeed. He is said to have contributed in no small way to the end of Muḥammad b. Eretna, whom he reportedly defeated in a battle near Ilgın in 1364;58 some time later, he is said to have made a bid for the throne in the Eretna sultanate, making a move on Kayseri.59 The Mongols were able to take the city and for the time being were undisputed masters in the region. Shortly after, Muḥammad b. Eretna was killed and his son ʿAlī Beg, still a minor, ascended the throne. This representative of the house of Eretna gets very bad marks (Melville speaks of “total incompetence”, 60 and many more authors – Sümer, Yücel, Nagel, Göde – could be quoted in the same vein). Bābūq then tried to take Sivas as well, but reports have it that his Mongol following decided otherwise, that is, they accepted ʿAlī Beg as sultan (and

55 Şikari, Karamannname, ed. Metin Sözen and Necdet Sakaoglu (İstanbul: Karaman Valiliği, 2005): pp. 120, 125. It is hard to rely on Şikari for events since the text appears to be an epic tale with the Karaman as hero(es) rather than a work of learned historiography. It was written long after the events; thus, it reflects a kind of regional memory of how things came to pass, and the characters and events are strongly typified. There seems to be no real difference in the way the hero treats Mongol, Türkmen or Turk emirs. See also Lindner, “Anatolia”: p. 105, and for a more extensive treatment, Yıldız, Sara Nur, “Razing Gevele and fortifying Konya: The beginning of the Ottoman conquest of the Karamanid principality in south-central Anatolia, 1468”, in The frontiers of the Ottoman world, ed. A.C.S. Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): pp. 307-29.
56 Şikari, Karamannname: p. 120.
57 Ibid.: pp. 117, 120.
60 Melville, “Anatolia”: p. 96.
Mongol aristocrats and Beyliks in Anatolia

his preceptors as the real power behind the throne), and so they changed sides.61

Astarābādī does not say anything about these fights, if only because the time frame of the book is a little later. The central figure of the Bābūq family in Bazm va Razm is thus one of Bābūq’s sons, ʿAlī Pāšā. He makes a first appearance in a confrontation between Burhān al-Dīn and Šād Geldi, the emir of Amasya and one of Burhān al-Dīn’s principal rivals. This was in the later months of 783 (late 1381). Many emirs of the Eretna sultanate, Mongols and Turks alike, had problems in accepting Burhān al-Dīn, who was not a member of the ruling house and could well be seen as an usurper. An envoy whom Burhān al-Dīn had sent to the ulūs emirs returned and said that ʿAlī Pāšā’s support was forthcoming. The Mongol leader “was then the leader of the ulūs military and the captain of the Mongol forces”.62 Burhān al-Dīn won a resounding victory in the ensuing battle, but the Mongol warriors did not really reach the battlefield. Nevertheless, ʿAlī Pāšā insisted on being treated as the most important figure: He demanded the jildū63—a particularly large part of the booty that can go to a warrior who has excelled in battle—and, in addition, the lion’s share of Šād Geldi’s fortune.64 This was not because his individual contribution or that of his warriors had been decisive, but simply because it was his due: he evidently saw himself as the leader in an alliance, not at all as a subordinate.

We do not know what terms Burhān al-Dīn offered ʿAlī Pāšā and his men in order to win their support, but from what follows it appears that ʿAlī Pāšā may have been under the impression that he had been cheated or that his understanding of what he had earned by supporting Burhān al-Dīn differed from what Burhān al-Dīn understood the agreement to be. It is probably no coincidence that the next story, immediately after the victory

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61 Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 84; Göde, Eratnalilar: pp. 104-5.
63 Doerfer, Türkische und mongolische Elemente: no. 162.
64 It is not at all unusual that whole provinces were asked for and given as jildū. Tīhrānī cites a number of such cases, and also refers to conflicts arising over claims to jildū that seemed unjustified (Tīhrānī, Abū Bakr (1964) Kitāb-i diyārbakrīyya, ed Faruk Sümer and Necati Lugal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, 1964 [repr. Tehran 1356 HS/1977]): pp. 48, 101 and in particular 451, 479, 540); in these cases, Timurid or Aq-Qoyunlu princes or emirs asked for entire provinces as jildū or claimed that such provinces were theirs by right of jildū. Doerfer (Türkische und mongolische Elemente: no. 162) also comes to the conclusion that the term was used to refer to the lion’s share of the booty.
over Šaad Geldi, is a report of a conspiracy. The conspirators, many of them Mongol emirs, had agreed on the following plan: Ālī Pāšā was to marry Ālī Beg’s widow, and Ālī Beg’s young son was to be put on the throne. There is a clear ‘legitimist’ note in all this: at least in name, rule should stay in the house of Eretna (and the Mongol emirs and their allies would then be free to work out who would in reality hold the reins of power). This is not the last conspiracy of the sort nor the last military action by the ulūs emirs against Burhān al-Dīn. At this point, Ālī Pāšā concluded an alliance with the Bārāmbāy, the group that most consistently opposed to Burhān al-Dīn (see below in the section on that group). The ulūs emirs were more often than not fighting Burhān al-Dīn at this stage, so their support went to the emir of Amasya. After Šaad Geldi, his son Amīr Aḥmad had taken over there.

Much later, Ālī Pāšā appeared in the Aksaray region, where he had a strong fortress from which he constantly harrassed some Mongol pastoralists. He did not come when summoned (a clear sign that something was wrong with him), and therefore, his fortress was put under siege (siege machinery is mentioned). Ālī Pāšā then moved to (another?) fortress called Karahisar (more than one fortress bears this name), which was taken and his entire family and treasure captured. The sultan, however, (to show his magnanimity) returned them all and Ālī Pāšā was given another fortress (Dūṅḥiṣār or Dūllhiṣār). This is the last time he is mentioned in BR, and his status at that juncture looks much degraded. He is styled as a vassal who has to come at his lord’s bidding, and the sultan’s generosity also indicates who was the lord. Towards the end of the narrative, then, Ālī Pāšā is reduced to simple local status, and he holds his last fortress by appointment. We may speculate that the other fortress(es) still were part of his family holdings, his patrimoine.

Besides Ālī Pāšā, no other sons of Bābūq appear in Bazm va Razm, but there were apparently other sons, and they are mentioned in other sources. Sümer names Esen, Maḥmūd and Tabarruk (Teberрук in Turkish) and there seems to be one more son called Bahtiyār. Tabarruk is named as

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65 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 259.
66 See ibid.: p. 263.
67 Ibid.: p. 266.
68 Ibid.: p. 265.
69 Ibid.: pp. 471f.
71 Şikari, Karamannname: p. 186.
the leading beg of the Tatar ulüs in Neşri. The context is a battle between
the Ottomans and the Karamanoğlu, fought near Konya in 1386. The
Ottoman sultan Murād was able to win over all the Mongol leaders, one by
one, and so he carried the day. In a sense this anticipates the battle at
Ankara between Bayezid (Yıldırım) and Timur in 1402, for there too the
outcome of the battle was determined by the Mongol groups – although, on
that occasion, they left the Ottoman camp and joined Timur. As is well
known, some time later many Anatolian Mongols were deported to Central
Asia; since one of the Mongol leaders is called Tabarruk in the Timurid
sources, there can be little doubt that the so-called ‘Black Tatars’ of the
Timurid sources are to be identified with the ulüs Mongols referred to in
the Ottoman and Persian sources written in Anatolia.

The reasons why the Tatars deserted at Ankara are given in the
Ottoman sources in a characteristic way. The Tatars remembered their old
loyalty to the Eretna sultanate, and that Muṭahhartan (the emir of Erzincan
who fought in Timur’s ranks) was Eretna’s nephew. Sümer is probably
right in putting a question mark over this family relationship; he points out
that this relationship is referred to only in later sources (and evidently in
order to explain the Tatar and some Türkmen defections). However that
may be, it is interesting to note that the Tatars were credited with a long-
standing loyalty to the house of Eretna, which is also borne out by the
testimony of Bazm va Razm.

Another leader of the ‘Black Tatars’ referred to in the Timurid sources
is called Muruwwat (Mürüvvet in Turkish texts). He makes one
appearance in Bazm va Razm, where he is reported to have taken Kırşehir

73 See also Mustafayev, Sâlcuqilârdan Osmanlılar: p. 90.
74 Hoca Sadeddin does not give any names, but he knows the “tribes” (tāfeler) who
fought at Konya: They were the Turgutlu, the Samagarlu, the Bayburtlu, the Türkmen,
the Tatar and the Varsak (Hoca Sadeddin Efendi, Tacüʾ- ‹tevârîh. Sadeleştiren Ismet
163).
75 Paul, “Who makes use of whom?”; idem, “Khalil”.
76 In another publication (“Khalîl”, note 29), I admitted that I had been unable to
identify the ‘Black Tatars’ in Bazm va Razm. The term itself does not occur in this
source, but the Mongol groups involved can clearly be identified as I hope I have
shown in the lines above.
77 Neşri, Kitāb-i cihân-nümâ: p. 351; Aşıkpaşazade/Kreutel, Vom Hirtenzelt zur
(in 1389)\textsuperscript{79}, and to have handed over the town to Burhān al-Dīn; in return, he was awarded Gedük (a fortress on the road from Kayseri to Sivas, present-day Şarkışla).\textsuperscript{80} No family link is given for Muruwwat; it is of course possible that he also was a member of the Bābūq family, but this is pure speculation.

To sum up this part: the Babukoğulları family was a very influential group in the second half of the fourteenth century. They were clearly able to mobilise numerous warriors and thus were a much sought-after ally in many campaigns. Politically, they seem to have been mostly loyal to the house of Eretna, but not without pursuing their own agenda. At times, this agenda may have included plans for a member of their family to claim the Eretna throne or else to become the man behind the throne. They are seen in control of castles and in some sources sometimes even towns or cities such as Niğde or Kayseri, and they were therefore local or regional lords who ruled over pastoralists as well as agriculturalists and urbanites.

Eventually, they were among those who negotiated the loyalty of the ‘Tatar’ warriors, including before and during the battle of Ankara. It is also they who negotiated the re-migration of the Anatolian Mongols (the ‘Black Tatars’) to Central Asia (if such negotiations ever took place). The leading role of the Babukoğulları in this process, alongside the promises which Timur is said to have made for their support at Ankara – a brilliant position for the Mongols in Anatolia – suggests that one of the reasons for the deportation of so many Mongols may have been a wish to forestall a restoration of the Eretna sultanate in Anatolia under the leadership of the Babukoğulları, Tabarruk or another representative of the family. This was evidently a real option: it should be borne in mind that only one generation earlier, Bābūq himself had made a bid for the throne.

Timur’s action against the Anatolian Mongols after the battle at Ankara sounded the death knell of Mongol power in the region. So many people were probably displaced that those who remained no longer played any significant role. Mongols are mentioned in the region after that, even in the first Ottoman census, but they did not wield any traceable political influence.\textsuperscript{81}

	extit{Ḫiţr Beg b. Şamāḡār}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.: p. 128.
\textsuperscript{80} Astarābādī, \textit{Bazm va Razm}, pp. 397ff.; Mustafayev, \textit{Sālcuqilārdān Osmanlılara}, p. 94; Yücel, \textit{Anadolu Beylikleri}: p. 142.
\textsuperscript{81} Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”.

\textit{Notes:}
As mentioned above, Ṣamāḡār family members held important military and political positions in Mongol Anatolia from early on, and Ṣamāḡār noyan himself had been military commander of all Mongol troops in the region for many years. Of the sons of Ṣamāḡār noyan, a man called ‘Arab deserves mention, because he is referred to as a governor of Sivas.82 Towards 1297, he participated in quelling a revolt in the Kirşehir region on behalf of the Ilkhanid government.83

The leader of the Ṣamāḡār family in Astarābdī was called Ḥiżr Beg and, although much time had elapsed since the first generation of Mongol rule to which Ṣamāḡār noyan belonged, he appears as his son, clearly meaning simply ‘descendant’ in this case. He is known from other sources as well: Neṣrī mentions him alongside Bābüq at the battle at Konya.84 He makes his first appearance in Bazm va Razm in a move towards Kayseri, which might have been an attempt either to take control of that city or just to be part of the seasonal migration to the summer pastures. Ultimately, Kayseri was not attacked (due to the efforts of Burhān al-Dīn) and the Mongols continued their migration without coming too close to the city. The story is probably narrated for a number of reasons: first, to show how Burhān al-Dīn was able to bring together a coalition against these Mongols, who were seen as an existential danger. This coalition even included the governor in charge at Kayseri, whose name we do not learn, but who apparently was either unwilling or unable to lead the defence of the city himself. Second, the author may have wanted to show how the Eretni ʿAlī Beg had to depend on Burhān al-Dīn’s help: ʿAlī Beg even swears an oath of brotherhood to the qāżī.85

The Ṣamāḡār Mongols were consistently a major factor in the power balance within the Eretnā sultanate, sometimes in competition with the Bārāmbāy. This is evident at numerous points, one of which is that the man who had temporarily taken over at Sivas, one Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm (a former military slave ḡulām), concluded a marital alliance with Ḥiżr Beg, as a consequence of which the Mongol leader received Kayseri.86 It has to be

85 Ibid.: p. 112: ʿahd muṭṣāmul bar ṣīqā-ʾi muṭṣādaqāt wa muṭṣāḥāt. This particular feature is not mentioned in the otherwise detailed descriptions of the “Mongol danger” at Kayseri and how Burhān al-Dīn was able to save the city (Göde, Eretnalalar: pp. 109f.; Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 52).
86 Astarābdī, Bazm va Razm, p. 121: ba-dallat-ı ʾan muṣṭāharat wa wasṣilat-ı ʾan muwaṣṣalat wa muṣṭāharat Qayṣarîyya ba-Ḥiżr Beg dâd.
noted that Ḫiẓr Beg was the leader of the Mongol group who were described as such a danger just a couple of pages earlier, and also that the text does not see the appointment as a disaster.

Ḡājjī Ḩājm proved faithful to his Ṣamāḡār alliance: some time later, he fought in a battle together with his allies (and on their behalf) against the Bārāmbāy, where he was killed. It was one Ḫwāja Beg who had Ḩiẓr Beg’s head severed from the body and sent first to Hāvīk (present-day Hafik, close to Sivas) and then on to the city itself. Could it be, then, that he was the leader of the Bārāmbāy group at that time and place?

The Ṣamāḡār were weakened, and thus it comes as no surprise that they went to see Burhān al-Dīn in Sivas and complained about some Syrian Türkmen who were hindering them from getting to their summer pastures. In a complex military action, the Ṣamāḡār Mongols and some Sivas forces together raided the Türkmen, indicating that a rather solid alliance had either existed before or was concluded on this occasion. Burhān al-Dīn had somehow inherited this alliance from Ḥājjī Ḩājm, whose place as emir and later sultan in Sivas he had assumed. This is the first time we see Burhān al-Dīn engaged in conflicts over grazing rights.

Later, when Burhān al-Dīn himself made a bid for power in Sivas, he succeeded in mobilising the Ṣamāḡār Mongols against competing claims raised by the emir of Amasya, Šād Geldi. It is interesting to see that both pretenders appear to have acted in the name of the (still very young) son of ʿAlī Beg, called Muḥammad or Muḥammad Čelebi. The Eretna loyalty is thus not questioned and appearances at least are saved; in an exchange of letters between Šād Geldi and Burhān al-Dīn, each tried to prove that he had been more loyal to the house of Eretna than the other and was still the truest servant of that dynasty.

Šād Geldi of Amasya had an alliance with yet another Mongol group, the Jáygāzān. Together with Šād Geldi, these Mongols advanced on Sivas just when Burhān al-Dīn was calling for his own Mongol allies, the Ṣamāḡār. The assailants declared that they wanted to put ʿAlī Beg’s son, the infant just mentioned, on the throne. Ultimately, after letters were exchanged between the two emirs, as we have read, the Jáygāzān Mongols had second thoughts: “Why should we prefer Šād Geldi? Everybody knows that he is of common descent, the son of a [military] slave, and

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87 Ibid.: p. 125.
88 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 234.
89 Ibid.: p. 235.
90 This boy sat in the throne council, and it was therefore not evident that the Eretna dynasty really had ceased to exist (Nagel, Tilman, Timur der Eroberer und die islamische Welt des späten Mittelalters [Munich: Beck, 1993]: p. 254).
lowly in every respect. The qāżī, in return, has many noble features, and it is unwise to make him one’s enemy.”91 As a result, they returned to their flocks and resumed their migrations, and Šād Geldi, “who had flown on their wings”92 was forced to turn tail and march back to Amasya.

Thus, in the military competition over the throne at Sivas after ʿAlī Beg’s death, two main actors, Šād Geldi and Burhān al-Dīn, both made extensive use of Mongol alliances.

Mongol alliances were available all along, of course, but at a price. Ḫwāja Beg got Kayseri from Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm, who later went on campaign on his behalf (and was killed). Burhān al-Dīn also called on the Ṣamāḡār and Ḫwāja Beg for support, and evidently he had agreed to return their services. The Mongols were a major, sometimes decisive military factor, and without Mongol support, no one could hope for success in the scramble for power. Questions of legitimacy were important, and the Mongols preferred to give at least nominal loyalty to the house of Eretna (whose fourth generation would come to the throne after the demise of ʿAlī Beg). Since no Činggisids were around, it may be assumed that loyalty to the house of Eretna was somehow linked to the fact that Eretna, in his day, had ruled in the name of the Ilkhanids. Now, after the extinction of the ruling Činggisid house in Iran, ‘legitimist’ Mongols had to look around for a replacement. In this situation, the Jaʿuni Qurban turned to a collateral line; this solution, however, had long been abandoned in Anatolia, and this is probably one of the reasons why the ulūs Mongols chose to consider the Eretna dynasty as their ruling house, to the point that Ottoman sources, as we have seen, establish a genealogical link between Muṭahhartan and Eretna in order to explain why the Mongols changed sides at Ankara. If the Anatolian Mongols really thought of the house of Eretna as the quasi-Činggisid focus of their political loyalties, it would be an interesting parallel to the Jaʿuni Qurban: Timur’s policy of mass deportation would then have targeted two major Mongol groups whose pro-‘Činggisid’ biases were well known.

Ḥwāja Beg

I have been unable to find out to which family or group Ḫwāja Beg belonged. I have mentioned above that he was the one who had Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm’s body beheaded after he was killed in a battle against the Bārambāy; this led to the question of whether Ḫwāja Beg could have been a member of the leading family of that group. In that case, he would

91 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 234, 236.
92 Ibid.: 236: ba-par-i īsān mī-parīd.
belong to the house of Sütay. This, however, must remain purely conjectural (for a discussion see below in the section ‘Kayseri – a Mongol beylik?’).

There is nevertheless evidence that he was one of the leading Mongol emirs. He appears as one of the leading figures in a conspiracy against Burhan al-Din (who was then already controlling the Eretnid sultanate). Because Burhan al-Din needed to take action against Erzincan, some Mongol emirs who were at that point staying in Sivas felt that their own plans would not materialise. Instead of moving against Erzincan, they had wanted to go to Kayseri, and now they saw that Burhan al-Din had other priorities. Therefore, they thought, it would be the right time to start plundering, seizing arms and horses, and then to roam the region, drive away whatever livestock there was and finally leave. Burhan al-Din was not slow in responding, and the Mongols could not put up any resistance. Somewhat lamely, they excused themselves, saying that the Syrian Türkmens (again) had gathered and raided the Mongols (aḫšām). Finally, Ḥwāja Beg “and the other Mongol tūšmālān came and apologised”. The term tūšmālān is used exclusively for Mongol leaders in BR, and mostly as a synonym for amīr, so that, even without the explicit statement that Ḥwāja Beg was a Mongol emir, it would be evident from the expression used.

Much earlier, after Burhan al-Din had acted so brilliantly in the defence of Kayseri against the Șamāḡar, the result was that ʿAlī Beg sent a letter stating that it would be best now to entrust Kayseri to Ḥwāja Beg, and apparently Ḥwāja Beg really took over. However, he did not hold this position for long; he was ousted shortly after, and was punished for having thrown Burhan al-Din into a dark pit. Ḥwāja Beg then profited from an intervention by Šād Geldī, to whom he was apparently related by ties of marriage. In the subsequent pages in BR, Ḥwāja Beg is said to

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93 For a genealogical table in which Ḥwāja Beg does not figure, see Gül, XIII. ve XIV. Yüzyıllarda, p. 144; Sümür, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”: p. 109.
94 Astarabādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 292.
95 Ibid.: p. 293.
97 Astarabādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 114.
98 Ibid.: p. 117.
100 Ibid.: p. 122. There is no space to elaborate on marital alliances here, but it is remarkable that two of the prominent Mongol leaders in BR have such ties to leading figures in the Eretnid sultanate, both of them contenders for the position of “man behind the throne”: Ḥiẓr Beg was allied to Ḥājiḥī İbrahīm, and Ḥwāja Beg to Šād Geldī of Amasya.
have been close to ’Alī Beg, but was at the same time one of those who wanted to keep him in a kind of honorary imprisonment, leading him around in a Mongol camp.\textsuperscript{101}

Later, Ḥwāja Beg apparently played a role in a number of conspiracies against Burhān al-Dīn.\textsuperscript{102} Again, legitimacy issues were at stake: one of the old guard of Sultan Eretna, an emīr called Yāqūt, had concluded an alliance with Amīr Ahmad of Amasya and, “together with Ḥwāja Beg, Aḥī Naurūz [another emīr who was deeply indebted to the house of Eretna] and those who were of the same mind succeeded in leading astray and seducing a large part of the army” so that Burhān al-Dīn suffered a heavy defeat.\textsuperscript{103}

Thus, at least periodically, the conflicts within the waning Eretna sultanate appear to have been a conflict between two major Mongol groups, the Șamāğār and the Bārāmbāy. While ’Alī Beg seems to have been committed to the Bārāmbāy (or was held as hostage by Bārāmbāy leaders), Burhān al-Dīn is sometimes seen as having been allied to the Șamāğār (whom he also had to hold at bay, however), with the Bābūq family probably siding with the Șamāğār most of the time. The Amasya emīrs consistently made common cause with just the faction that was denying Burhān al-Dīn’s legitimacy, and vice versa. The succession struggle, if it was not a conflict between Mongol factions, organised around two leading families, may also have been a conflict between Sivas and Amasya; Kayseri was a special case. Besides playing the opposing part to Sivas and its current Mongol partners, Amasya also tried to mobilise two Mongol groups whose relationship to the Șamāğār and the Bārāmbāy is not clear, the Jāyğāzān and the Jāwūnqār, only to be deserted by both.

The leading Mongol families sometimes appear as king-makers; they are important because they commanded one of the most important reservoirs of military manpower. One of their favourite strategies was to sell their loyalty to the highest bidder, and they were notorious for changing allegiance at the most decisive moments. In a sense, they appear to have made use of their vassal status as a resource, making arrangements in such a way that the overlord was forced to honour his obligations (as Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm had with the Șamāğār), so that the vassals profited more from the alliance than the lord. This pattern is also evident in the cooperation between Mongol emīrs and Burhān al-Dīn.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.: pp. 130, 140.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.: pp. 268, 282, 292.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.: 268: ba-ittifāq-i Aḥī Naurūz wa Ḥwāja Beg wa-man qāla bi-qaulihim ma’azm-i sipāh-rā iğwā wa istihwā karda.
Cooperation

We have seen that Mongol warriors were an important factor for every ambitious man in the post-Ikhanid political scene in Central Anatolia. Bonds of vassalage, alliances and partnerships are sometimes hard to tell apart. On the one hand, the political objectives – taking power in Sivas, Kayseri or in other places – were mostly defined by the pretenders to the throne(s), and only rarely do we see Mongol emirs as such claimants. On the other, it can be observed that lords or would-be lords quite often took action on behalf of their vassals. Such action was regularly directed against people the Mongol emirs themselves had identified as competitors or enemies, and in many cases, those people are Mongols themselves.

There do not seem to be many ways to find out what the Mongols wanted for themselves, and there is a clear bias in BR (and also in the Ottoman sources) towards taking for granted an innate lust for plunder; besides, an equally innate fickleness was characteristic of every Mongol fighting force: anyone who relied on Mongol support had to be aware that they were liable to change sides in battle, and indeed there are quite a number of accounts in which that is what decided the day. But why the Mongols acted in the way they did does not really seem to matter.

I have quoted two reports above (at note 88) in which it was the Mongols who proposed a target for a campaign or who took the initiative to come to court in order to suggest a campaign. In both cases, the issue was pasture – summer pasture, to be precise – and the enemies were Syrian Türkmen. Pasture has been underestimated as a motive for ‘nomadic’ behaviour in the Seljuq case too.104

In what follows, more cases of cooperation between Burhān al-Dīn and Mongol groups will be presented. The question is: who had the initiative, what was the aim of the cooperation aimed at, and what were the results? Before beginning with the examples, it should be remembered that issues of legitimacy were certainly very serious, and it seems more than probable that the Mongols did not at first accept Burhān al-Dīn’s rule as legitimate.105 It is not clear how long Burhān al-Dīn kept the Eretna descendant as nominal ruler. He somehow disappears from the record and

104 Peacock, “Nomadic society”.

105 Unlike the Turkish authors, Nagel sees this clearly. He states, after having reported a conspiracy (in an urban milieu without Mongol participation): “Even after having occupied the sultanate for more than six years, Burhān al-Dīn was nothing more than an usurper in many people’s eyes” (1993, 258: “Auch nach mehr als sechsjährigem Sultanat blieb Burhān al-Dīn in den Augen vieler nichts weiter als ein Thronräuber”).
is mentioned no more; apparently, he was killed in 1390 before he reached maturity.106

There is a pattern in the cooperation between Burhān al-Dīn and the Mongols which one may call the ‘spring visit’ pattern. Practically every year, when on their spring migration to the summer pastures, the Mongol leaders (called umarā or tusimālān) come to see Burhān al-Dīn in Sivas. There is an exchange of presents, and then consultations begin; the Mongol emirs make some suggestions, and frequently, action is then taken accordingly.

All the following examples belong to the period when Burhān al-Dīn sat on the throne in Sivas, and the initial legitimacy problems were no longer so urgent, at least not for the ulūs Mongols, who apparently had come to a kind of understanding with the sultan. It should be kept in mind that the term ulūs might also mean a group of pastoralists (mostly, but not exclusively Mongol) who had decided to accept a given person as their lord. The ulūs emirs in the following examples could, therefore, be just those Mongol emirs who worked together with Burhān al-Dīn.

Since many of the cases concern Kayseri, there will be some overlap with the following section, in which the question of who ruled what in and around Kayseri will be discussed. For ease of reference, the cases will be numbered.

1. One spring, the ulūs emirs came to see Burhān al-Dīn and said: “If Your Excellency takes into consideration that the ulūs warriors are part of the victorious army of the sultanate” and since they obeyed his orders, it was necessary to free Kayseri and add this region to the sultan’s realm.107

The source goes on to explain that the background was that someone called the “son of ʿUmar” was preventing them from occupying their habitual pastures around Kayseri and had barred the migration routes. This is the proposed action against Kayseri that did not take place because Burhān al-Dīn had to move against Erzincan (see above at note 95). The Mongols, as we have seen, under the leadership of Ḥwāja Beg and other emirs, reacted by plundering whatever horses and animals they could find

106 Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 22.
107 Astarabādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 291: agar raʾyi aʾla ihtimān har an masrūf dārad ki ḥašam-i ulūs dar sawād-i lāškar-i maššur ma dūd wa munḥaṣar gārdad wa jumlagī muṭiʾ-i amr waخرج wa ṣawānd Ḍayṣariyya mustahlīs miḥāyād kard waʾan nawāḍi dar ḫauza-yi tammālāk miḥāyād āward. Note the vocabulary of vassalic subordination in this passage. In particular, the Mongol troops appear as “obedient to orders”. But on the other hand, this subordination is the basis for a claim on the lord: he has to defend the vassal’s interest.
in and around Sivas. Did they need the animals? Had the “son of ʿUmar” succeeded in robbing them of their herds?

2. Probably the following year, the Mongol emirs returned. And again, they complained about the situation around Kayseri. This time, their enemy is called Junaid (and it is possible to identify the “son of ʿUmar” with this Junaid). Junaid had taken the fortress Gedük (held by a man called Farīdūn, probably also a Mongol emir108), and at the end of the yayla season, Junaid went to Ürgüp,109 which brought him into conflict with the Karamanoğlu. Some time later that year, Burhān al-Dīn appeared before Kayseri with his troops, who included Mongol warriors; the siege was initially a failure because the Mongols did not stand up to a sortie made by the Kayseri garrison. Burhān al-Dīn therefore entrusted the gate, which previously had been the Mongols’ section of the siege circle, to a seasoned captain.110

3. Some time later (dated 786, beginning on 24 February 1384), there was another action against Kayseri. Once more, the Mongol emirs came and stressed how wonderful it was that all the problems with Erzincan and Amasya and the Syrian Türkmen had now been solved, so that it was now time to devote some attention to the (deplorable) state of the ulūs nomads and to finish off Junaid at Kayseri. The campaign then took place, and the city was taken. The “sons of ʿUmar”, however, took refuge in the citadel (called Aḥmadak).111 Here, as in other cases, it becomes apparent that the city notables did not really cooperate with Junaid; it would otherwise be difficult to explain how the city could have been taken but not the citadel. This situation apparently lasted for quite a while or else was repeated some time later (see below).

4. After some mopping-up operations in the Kayseri region, a conflict between Burhān al-Dīn and the Karamanoğlu became virulent. The Sivas forces had clearly been able to take control of much of what had been Junaid’s domain, and so he sought an alliance with the Karaman, who were probably quite willing to accept Junaid as an ally to check Burhān al-Dīn’s expansion. This conflict is the subject of the next example: Next spring, again, the Mongol emirs came to see the sultan, and again, they complained: the Karamanoğlu was sending against them robbers who attacked their herds, and also still was lending support to Junaid. The

108 I have elsewhere portrayed Farīdūn as a Mongol emir (Paul, “Landscape”). Gedük is located close to present-day Şarkışla.
109 Ürgüp is around 65 km to the west of Kayseri, on the road to Nevşehir and on to Konya.
110 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 300-1.
111 Ibid.: pp. 304-5.
Mongols even suggested a route by which to march against the Karamanoğlu. The latter, however, under pressure from an Ottoman attack, responded diplomatically and promised to stop attacking and molesting the Mongol nomads and their flocks. But when it became clear that the Ottomans were content with taking Eğirdir and the immediate danger was over, the Karaman apparently returned to their old ways.112

5. Next spring, the emirs came again, and again they stated that the “son of ’Umar” was still active around Kayseri. But we do not learn of any proposal to put an end to it.113

6. Some time later, again they moved against Kayseri and Junaid who, however, had by now established his quarters at Develi. In spite of rain and cold, the siege was brought to its end. As a result, “the Mongol and Turkic nomads of the ulūs who had been afflicted by the evil of this wrongdoer and, for fear of him, had been barred from their pastures and grasslands, now were able joyfully to proceed to their summer quarters and could migrate along their traditional routes with their herds in safety”.114

7. Some time later, maybe the following year, the emirs came, but no action was decided on.115

8. The hesitating and sometimes faltering cooperation between the ulūs emirs and Burhān al-Dīn against the Ottomans (under Bayezid) is at first narrated outside the habitual ‘spring visit’ pattern. While Kayseri and Junaid were targets suggested by the Mongol emirs, the Ottomans came from the outside, and the Mongols at first seem to stand aside, waiting for the stronger man to emerge.116 It is characteristic that some Mongol emirs rejected summons to join a campaign against the Ottomans because some of their pastures were in Ottoman-controlled territory.117

9. At one point, and after a victory had been won over the Ottomans, they seem to have opted for Burhān al-Dīn, and again, it is the Mongols who suggest a campaign. From their words, it looks more like a raid, with

112 Ibid.: pp. 312-4.
113 Ibid.: p. 324.
114 Ibid.: p. 386: aḥšām wa atrāk-i ulūs ki az šarar-i šarr-i ān šarīr sūḵta būdand wa az ḫauf-i ā az marā ʾī wa maṣārīḥ-i būd maṇmāʾ wa maḥṣūr ḵāir al-bāl mutawajjih-i yailāq šūdand wa dar manṣūr wa marāḥil-i qadīm āmin al-sīr bī maḵaṣṭand. I would like to stress that aḥšām wa atrāk is not really an ethnic category, and should perhaps be translated simply as ‘nomads’, with both terms pointing to a way of life; atrāk as an ‘ethnic’ term would call for another ‘ethnic’ term in a binary combination, and whatever aḥšām might be, it certainly does not denote ‘ethnicity’.
116 See ibid.: p. 405 for the hesitant attitude of the Mongol emirs.
destruction and plunder as the first priority, and as a second reason they give their wish to increase Burhān al-Dīn’s fame.118

10. The ‘spring visit’ pattern sets in again in the next scene,119 and again, the Mongol emirs propose a campaign against the Ottomans. But there were other voices in the council, which stressed that, as long as the Amasya question was not settled, a campaign against the Ottomans did not make sense. This was the line Burhān al-Dīn himself opted for.

11. On the next occasion, however, the Mongol emirs opined that in the preceding year a capital opportunity had been wasted. Burhān al-Dīn replied that this could still be corrected (istiḍrāk mumkin).120 He also expressed his astonishment that some of the Mongol emirs had not joined the Sivas troops but had supported the Ottomans instead. They are pardoned, and the sultan tries to win their loyalty by lavish presents.121

12. The next time, we see a confrontation with the Karamanoğlu. Burhān al-Dīn had won a victory over this rival, and the Mongol emirs came to offer congratulations. They wanted a particular fortress (called Uĉhîsâr)122 and threatened to lay waste to as much of the Karaman lands as they could if their request was not granted. It was granted, however, and the Karamanoğlu politely asked to whom he should deliver the places. Burhān al-Dīn at that point named one of the Mongol emirs (yakī az mašâhîr-i ajnâd).123

As a result, we see that, after the legitimacy issue had been settled in some way, there was rather close cooperation between Burhān al-Dīn and the ulūs emirs. The text of course styles Burhān al-Dīn as the leading figure, given that it is the ulūs emirs who come to him. Regular visits are indeed a feature of some kind of ‘vassalic’ subservience. But if we look at the political results, another image emerges. In the first years, and before the Ottoman impact in Central Anatolia became a major problem, the spring consultations more often than not resulted in campaigns which the ulūs emirs had proposed and which were clearly in their interest. In particular, the campaigns directed at Kayseri and the surrounding region

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118 Ibid.: p. 408.
119 Ibid.: p. 418.
120 Ibid.: p. 423.
121 Ibid.: p. 424.
122 Uchisar in Turkish texts. No location given in Yücel (Anadolu Beylikleri: pp. 157-9), but it is probably to be identified with modern Uçhisar; this town (with a notable fortress) is located at about 80 km west of Kayseri, on the road to Nevşehir, and is only 15 km from Ürgüp (to the west). This example shows how far west the Mongols went in their migrations. Burhān al-Dīn’s beylik at Sivas was not their only partner.
123 Astarabādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 430.
and the “son of ʿUmar” group represented by Junaid were intended to obtain for the Mongols free and privileged access to pasture. The Sivas forces were therefore protecting Mongol interests.

Mongol leaders had earlier aspired to gain control of Kayseri, either for prestige reasons, or as a springboard for even more ambitious designs, or as part of a plan to establish a beylik there. These Mongol leaders either were no followers of Burhān al-Dīn or had now made other choices; none of his allies or vassals any longer made claims to the Eretna throne.

When Burhān al-Dīn had to confront the Karaman or the Ottomans, however, the Mongol leaders seem to have been divided. Some of them hesitated, partly because they did not want to jeopardise the pasture they had in Ottoman territory, while others proposed raids for plunder and military glory. Fortresses also played a certain role; Mongol leaders not infrequently appeared as castellans.

In the one case (no. 1 above) where political and military necessities urged Burhān al-Dīn to turn down the Mongol suggestions (when he had to march on Erzincan), they defected and even turned against the Sivas population. It does not matter that they had ultimately to submit: clearly, they were following their own priorities, and it appears that in this case, the first priority was to acquire livestock by whatever means.

Astarābādī does not report any explicit arrangement between Burhān al-Dīn and the ulūs emirs. But the ‘spring visit’ pattern clearly shows that they had claims on the sultan, that he had undertaken to protect them and to defend their interests as best he could, and that in return they had accepted him as legitimate ruler. The ulūs’ interests are very evidently linked to mobile livestock raising. Herds, pastures and migration routes were vital. And the region where these interests were most contested was Kayseri.

Kayseri – a Mongol beylik?

Kayseri had been part of the Eretna state, and the regions between Kayseri and Sivas, between Kayseri and Niğde, and between Kayseri and Kırşehir held major concentrations of ‘Mongol’ pastoralists. Their winter quarters were situated on the plain of the Anatolian plateau and perhaps extended relatively far west; the summer pastures were located in the mountains to the southeast and east. Mount Erçiyas rises to more than 3,900m above sea level quite close to Kayseri, and agreeable summer camp sites could be found there, as well as in the Eastern Taurus mountain range. Besides the city of Kayseri, the region had a number of noted fortresses: Gedük on the road to Sivas, Ürgüp and Uçhisar on the road to Nevshehir and on to Konya, and Develi controlling the foothills of Mt Erçiyas and the road to Malatya.
There were more fortresses, unidentified, but not without importance. Local lords held these fortresses (emir Farīdūn held Gedük at one point and Develi at another; Junaid himself was restricted to Develi after he had had to vacate Kayseri; a Mongol emir was set up at Uçhisar). 124

After the death of Sultan Eretna, the Kayseri region drifted slowly out of what remained of central control, and through a long and tortuous story, Burhān al-Dīn was finally successful, if only for a little while, in establishing his rule there. In what follows, the evidence in Astarābādī will be presented. Who held Kayseri, and what does it mean when we say that Kayseri ‘belonged’ to a given beylik?

In 777 (beginning on 2 June 1375), the Karamanoğlu took over at Kayseri, apparently with Mongol support; the Şamāğār and the Jaygāzān are explicitly mentioned. The source leads us to think that this was the first time for decades that the city had changed hands, and secure Eretnid control ended only then. 125 It was Burhān al-Dīn, the still youthful qāżī of Kayseri, who managed to expel the Karaman; the narrative stresses divine support. This may be read as one of the more hagiographic elements in Bazm va Razm, and it is evident that the author’s aim is to demonstrate that Burhān al-Dīn was destined to rule. 126

Some time later, in order to show that Burhān al-Dīn also commanded the sympathies of the Kayseri notables, the author has Burhān al-Dīn and ‘Alī Beg competing in a kind of race for Kayseri, Burhān al-Dīn starting in Tokat and ‘Alī Beg in Amasya. In spite of his position, which should in principle have made him sole master of the erstwhile Eretna dominions, ‘Alī Beg lost the race and was unable to find a secure position around Kayseri. He therefore moved on to Ürgüp, that is, even closer to the Mongols, to whom he is consistently linked. 127

All this culminates in the story (mentioned above at note 85) about the Mongol threat to Kayseri. An unnamed governor, possibly one of ‘Alī Beg’s Mongol supporters, was shown to join the defence rather reluctantly. As we have seen, a result of Burhān al-Dīn’s reported heroic deeds was that the Mongol emir Ḥwāja Beg (perhaps a Bārāmbāy leader), on ‘Alī

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124 For the significance of fortresses, see Paul, “Landscape”.
125 This is the impression we get from Astarābādī. In other reports, the Karamanoğlu had intervened in Kayseri earlier, in Muḥammad b. Eretna’s times (Göde, Eratnalılar: p. 91). ‘Alī Beg’s father Muḥammad had been unable to bring the Mongols under control (Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 17), and he spent his reign in constant action against them, with changing results. In his times, a Mamluk force from Aleppo was able to penetrate into Anatolia and to enter Kayseri (ibid.: p. 18).
126 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 96, 98.
127 Ibid.: p. 108.
Beg’s order and with the consent of Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm, was installed in Kayseri, but not for long. Now Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm’s star rose, and he was then able to install his ally Ḥīzr Beg (Ṣamāḡār) as governor in Kayseri. This, too, was not to last; in the course of the intra-Mongol fight pitting Ṣamāḡār against Bārāmbāy, Ḥājjī Ibrāhīm was killed and the Bārāmbāy won. Now, for the first time, Burhān al-Dīn was appointed to the “office of finance and army” (waṣīfa-yī māl wa laškar) at Kayseri and as far as Kırşehir. He was thus in charge of one of the most important regions, one of the central winter pastures of Mongol groups. On the other hand, other Mongol groups must have escaped Burhān al-Dīn’s control, either because they were using land where Karaman rule held sway, or because they were allied to Amasya.

In the later years of ‘Alī Beg’s reign, no one individual seems to have been firmly established at Kayseri. On the contrary, there was heavy competition for control of the city and its hinterland and the pastures in its vicinity, and the main competitors were rival Mongol groups. Both these groups had their allies (and patrons) at Sivas, Amasya or elsewhere.

It is difficult to find out when Junaid took over at Kayseri, and equally there is no direct indication of who appointed him. He is first mentioned as governor of the city during a campaign against Erzincan in which he participated in that capacity, maybe around 1379.

Junaid is an enigmatic figure. Sümer includes him in his list of important emirs who were active during ‘Alī Beg’s reign (1365-80): Šād Geldí of Amasya, Śidd Ḥusām, ‘Alī Beg’s deputy (nāʾib) (and lover), Qeđe Arslan of Koyulhisar (and Karahisar), Šaḥ Najib (pisar-i Tāj ad-dīn) of Niksar and finally Junaid of Kayseri. Sümer goes on to say that “no one of these emirs was of Mongol stock”, and he gives some evidence for this statement for every person he has quoted, but not for Junaid. Yücel is not quite so explicit. In numerous places, he mentions Junaid as governor in Kayseri, but does not specify his genealogical or ethnic background. There is only one place where Yücel identifies him as a Turk in a list of who was important during ‘Alī Beg’s reign, which is evidently taken from Sümer. He says: “Apparently, all these were Turks and many of them had

129 Ibid.: p. 121.
130 Ibid.: p. 131.
131 Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 65; Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 163.
been appointed to their offices in the times of Eretna.”

Göde not only claims that ʿAlī Beg, although he was a Turk, pretended to be a Mongol, but he repeats Sümer’s list of important emirs (Junaid is called Kayseri Sâhibi Şeyh Cüneyd), and adds “Out of these, no one was of Mongol stock”. There is in fact no evidence that Junaid was a Turk or a Türkmen, but on the other hand, there is nothing to prove that he was a Mongol. However, there are some hints in Bazm va Razm that he acted together with Mongols and in ways that are considered to be Mongol. All the quoted authors agree that the man styled as “son of ʿUmar” in this source is identical with Junaid, but none gives any suggestion as to who this ʿUmar might have been. In sum, the question of whether Junaid was a Mongol is not a question of ethnicity, but a question of which group he represented.

For some years, Junaid seems to have been in more or less firm control in Kayseri. Sivas did not have much influence there, but neither did Junaid apparently interfere in Sivas. Nevertheless, Kayseri was considered part of the Eretna sultanate. In around 1380, when the succession struggle after ʿAlī Beg’s death was at its most intense, Burhān al-Dīn suggested something to Qılıç Arslan that would have amounted to a partition of what remained of the Eretna heritage: he asked for Kayseri (which he probably would have had to wrest from Junaid’s hands) and also demanded that Sivas waive all rights to intervene there. Qılıç Arslan refused, and so we have to assume that Junaid continued. Nonetheless, when Burhān al-Dīn went to Kayseri, the Mongols of that region received him well, and he would have been able to take the city, had not an envoy arrived from Sivas. Qılıç Arslan is said to have written in his letter: “Now it is best that you return [to Sivas] so that we first free our minds from the affair of Hājjī Šād Geldi; after that, we’ll together move on and conquer Kayseri.” Moreover, he sent another representative to Junaid, trying to win him

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133 Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 19: “Görüldüğü üzere bunların bütünü Türk idiler ve çoğu bu görevlere Eretna zamanında atanmıştılar”.


135 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 189, 198; see Paul, “Landscape”.
Mongol aristocrats and Beyliks in Anatolia

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over. This alliance with Junaid was another reason why Qılıç Arslan forfeited his life and his rule; Burhān al-Dīn killed him shortly after.

In the year 785 (beginning on 6 March 1383), when Burhān al-Dīn completed his fortieth year, or the following spring, during the habitual ‘spring visit’, the Mongol emirs and Burhān al-Dīn agreed on a campaign against Kayseri. This was because Junaid had exceeded all limits in his wrongdoing: he had sent troops against Gedük, which was an open threat to Sivas. Earlier, his people had fortified a cave on the Sivas river. Now he was continuously sending ‘robbers’ who drove and carried away what they could find. At the end of the summer (785 or 786/1383-4), Junaid went to the fortress of ‘Burkūt’ (vocalised thus in BR; this probably is Ürgüp), and thus came into conflict with the Karaman who evidently had claims on that region. Moreover, Junaid had attacked a caravan of Mecca pilgrims who were passing through Kayseri at that time. For all these reasons, Burhān al-Dīn took action, and a siege of Kayseri followed. His Mongol allies, however, did not fight well; they had been assigned a certain gate, and when the Kayseri warriors made a sortie, the Mongols simply ran away (see example no. 2 above).

At this juncture, Junaid seems to be an independent ruler, controlled neither by Sivas nor by Karaman. No other regional power could have claimed suzerainty over Kayseri at that time.

Now, news arrived that Muṭahharten had moved against Sivas and was already close to the city. Immediately, Burhān al-Dīn took appropriate measures. One of these was that he told the arbāb wa kadbudāyān (landlords and well-to-do people) of Kayseri province to bring together their families and flocks and to go to Sivas. Who are these men? Simply people who had supported Burhān al-Dīn against Junaid? Can the presence of flocks in the list of what they were to take with them be read as a hint that pastoralism was one of the things that mattered to them? What

136 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 190 șalāḥ-i waqt dar ʾan ast ki bāz gardī tā naḥust ḥāʾir az qaẓiya-yi Ḥājjī Ṣād Geldā ba-parḍāzīm ʾāngāh bi-itṭifāq mutawajjih āšārim wa Qaysariyya musuḫjar gardānim. wa-nāʾiḥī digar ba-Junaid ki wāli-yi Qaysariyya bād firistād wa ū-rā istimālāt dād.

137 Other reasons are detailed in Paul, “Landscape”.

138 For the identification, see Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 50, n. 68.

139 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 300-1.

140 The fortress ‘Fāris’ mentioned in the source was apparently only two kilometers from Sivas (to the NE) (Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 110, n. 54).

141 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 130: naukarān ba-vilāyat-i Qaysariyya firistād tā arbāb wa kadbudāyān-i vilāyat-rā kāc karda bā ahl wa ʾiyāl wa ḥawāṣī wa mawāṣī ba-Sivās ārand.
arrangements did they have with Junaid previously, before they were given
the option to move away? Did they have any relation to the ālūs emirs who
regularly came to Sivas and complained of Junaid?

Next, Burhān al-Dīn had to campaign against Amasya because the
Ottomans had begun to speed up their eastward expansion (in this case,
towards Kastamonu). It is not clear whether Mongol allies participated in
the campaigns. Only after everything was over did they remind Burhān al-
Dīn that the Kayseri business was unfinished (example no. 3 above142),
and indeed the campaign continued. This time, Burhān al-Dīn was able to
take the city because some of the city notables opened the gates. Junaid
and his people, however, did not give up but continued to fight from the
citadel Aḥmadak. Some fortresses in the province were also taken, but then
Burhān al-Dīn had to retreat: a Karaman force was approaching. From now
on, Junaid appears to have had support from the Karaman, with whom he
had fought over Ürgüp some time earlier, but of course this does not mean
that he had accepted the Karaman as his overlord.

Eventually, Burhān al-Dīn had to vacate the city of Kayseri, and to
fight elsewhere over the next years.

In a winter campaign (included in example no. 4 above, probably 1386-
7),143 Burhān al-Dīn set out to fight the robber gangs (ḥarāmī) who joined
Junaid from here and there. In fact, these ‘robbers’ were nomads, and more
exactly, Mongols. It was only in the winter time that one could fight them,
because they were then staying more or less quietly in their tents, whereas
in summer, they were dispersed on inaccessible mountain tops. Their
chiefs were called tūšmālān – an indicator that they were Mongols, and
they were the decisive support for Junaid; without them, he would not have
been able to resist. A certain Ḫusain held a fortress for Junaid in the region
(we do not know exactly where, but we know that there were Mongol
winter quarters along the Kayseri-Sivas road and in the steppe region
between the two cities). He was “the leader of these nomads” (buzurg-i ān
aḥšām būd). The fortress was taken and Ḫusain was led away in chains.

It is tempting to link the Anatolian Mongols, and in particular the
followers of Junaid, to the people called čītāḡ in Timurid sources (a term
with a clear pejorative shade, “robbers” would not be too far off the mark);
when Timur came to Anatolia, they were in control at ḻafik, but also a

142 Ibid.: p. 304.
143 See Nagel, Timur der Eroberer: pp. 258-9; Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 331. The
new campaign against Kayseri was brought to an end when Timur made his first
inroads into eastern Anatolia. This gives a firm basis for dating: Timur first came to
Anatolia in spring 1387. For this campaign, see also Aubin, Jean: “Comment Tamerlan
prenait les villes”, StIs 19 (1963), 83-122.
relevant force in the Kayseri region. There, Timur’s warriors took away their herds, horses, mules, cattle and sheep – thus, they probably were no robbers or rebels, but rather nomads.144

Junaid held the citadel of Kayseri (still, and as a result of the campaign described above in no. 3), and his last trump card was that he was able to negotiate the release of Aḥḥī ʿĪsā, whom he had taken prisoner in the previous campaign. The latter was a close retainer and even as close a friend to Burhān al-Dīn as the source can say;145 there are no hints at his genealogical background. As a result, there was a kind of agreement: Aḥḥī ʿĪsā was freed and Junaid was pardoned. Of course the source insists on this having been a victory for Burhān al-Dīn. However, it does not come as a surprise that only a short time later, Junaid was again active around Kayseri in the same fashion.146 The ensuing action again was not taken to its end because new enemies were arriving, this time from the south – the Mamluks.147 During the ensuing wars, which included a Mamluk siege of Sivas and much marching back and forth, Mongol allies and the difficulties of predicting their behaviour, Junaid (of course) sided with the Mamluks. Finally, Junaid was reduced to Develi, an important fortress, but not a ‘capital’ city like Kayseri (this situation is mentioned above at no. 6).148


145 He had shared a stint in prison with Burhān al-Dīn (in the dark pit), which earns him comparisons to Yūsuf and Abū Bakr; he had served as an envoy to Šād Geldi; he had sat in the mażālim court where Aḥḥī Naurūz and other Mongol conspirators were judged. (It is strange to see a mażālim court adjudicating such cases. Could this be a euphemism for the Mongol court that would have authority there, the yarūd?) He had been in charge of fighting the fortified cave Junaid’s people had built on the Sivas river, together with two emirs who were probably Mongols (with the forces they had at their disposal). Finally, he had been in command of “the Kayseri troops” (ajnād-i Qaysariyya) that were sent ahead of the Sivas army, apparently against the citadel of Kayseri. The plan was to lure Junaid out of the citadel and into an ambush. But Junaid was not naive enough to take the bait, and the plan did not work. In another action, Junaid’s people succeeded in taking Aḥḥī ʿĪsā prisoner. Although Burhān al-Dīn fought hard to free his friend, he did not succeed, but returned to Sivas (after having taken much booty), and it seems that he then went to summer camps on the Köse Dağ (together with his Mongol allies(?)) (Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: pp. 116, 228, 281, 286, 325).

146 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 344: dast ba-qat‘-i ṭuruq wa istiṣāl-i ziyā‘-i Qaysariyya dirāz.

147 See Nagel, Timur der Eroberer: pp. 260-2 for details.

do not learn how the story ended; there is a last appearance of Junaid’s brother, who controlled a fortress in the Kayseri region (Uçhisar).149

We do not have to determine whether Junaid was an ethnic ‘Mongol’, but there are some clues that support the idea: he was associated with Mongols as his military supporters; he behaved as ‘settled’ people would expect Mongols to behave; he was in control of an area that was rather densely populated by Mongols and had been of vital interest to them for decades. Earlier, Mongol leaders had often tried and sometimes succeeded in being appointed to Kayseri, in particular representatives of the Şamâğâr, such as Hızr Beg, and representatives of the Bârâmbây, such as Hwâja Beg (if it is correct that he belonged to that family). Taking into consideration that it was Hwâja Beg who had thrown Burhân al-Dîn into the dark pit where he had spent weeks together with Ahi İsâ, and that the conspirators Ahi İsâ was judging included Ahi Naurûz, a follower of the Bârâmbây faction, it is perhaps not too far off the mark to suppose that Junaid had taken over leadership of just that faction (which we may for convenience call the Bârâmbây), whether he belonged to the leading family of that group or not. This leading family, as has been stated above, was descended from Sütay noyan, governor of Diyarbakır for the Ilkhans, and Bârâmbây was the name of the man who led part of the Mongol army of Diyarbakır into Central Anatolia. Now Bârâmbây apparently had a son called ‘Umar.150 It is of course pure conjecture to establish a link between Junaid as the “son of ‘Umar” and this obscure figure in the Sütay family tree; nevertheless, the observation can be made.

However that may be, the assumption that Junaid could have been a member of the Sütay family is not central to the following argument. It is quite evident, as we have seen, that he controlled Kayseri without really depending on any overlord, either Burhân al-Dîn or the Karaman. This would also explain why the source does not mention his being appointed. He took over at a point when Kayseri was contested between Burhân al-Dîn and Hwâja Beg, who also may have been a Bârâmbây leader. Junaid’s military support is time and again shown to have consisted mainly of Mongol nomads.

What Junaid ran, then, was a Mongol beylik at Kayseri. This beylik did not differ in its essential features from other Anatolian beyliks. It included a major town, agricultural lands, and pastures; its population was mixed, comprising Mongol and Turkic Muslims and various kinds of Christians; its army was mostly made up of nomadic warriors with perhaps an

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150 Gül, XIII. ve XIV. Yüzyıllarda Doğu: see the genealogical table at p. 144, which is simply a reproduction of the table in Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”: p. 109.
admixture of professional soldiers (who may have constituted a smaller proportion in Junaid’s case than in well-established beyliks such as the Karaman); the emirs serving Junaid controlled the open space from fortresses they held, of which there were several, including famous ones such as Gedük and Develi. There is one point on which it is still impossible to get a more precise answer: we do not know whether Junaid was part of some kind of dynasty. This would be the case if he indeed was related to the Sütay leading family of the Bārāmbāy Mongols, and the fact that he is called “pisar-i ʿUmar” hints at the way his contemporaries thought of him: he was a wrongdoer, he consistently sided with the wrong people, but he represented a ‘house’ just as the other beylik emirs did. We do not have a beylik called the ʿōmeroğulları, but we well might.

Like the Jaʿuni Qurban realm in western Khurasan, the ‘Ōmeroğulları’ beylik in Kayseri was larger than the basic beylik because it included not only one city, but also a handful of major fortresses. Fission processes cannot be detected in this particular case, but there are some hints that at least one of the fortresses (Develi) could have functioned as the core of such a basic beylik.\footnote{Paul, “Landscape”}

Junaid came into conflict with the Karaman over regional fortresses and the space controlled by them (Ürgüp), but he was able to secure a Karaman alliance against Burhān al-Dīn later. He evidently sided with every major power that could alleviate the pressure on him, including the Mamluks. The reason for his conflict with Burhān al-Dīn might have been twofold: for one, if he was indeed a representative of the Bārāmbāy, there were old griefs between the two such as Burhān al-Dīn’s time in the dark pit, and the suspicion that it had been Bārāmbāy emirs who had fostered so many conspiracies against him together with Šād Geldi. But it is also evident that pasture was a major point. The ʿulūs emirs who came to see Burhān al-Dīn regularly are not identified by their affiliation, but from the alliances Burhān al-Dīn had before and during his bid for power, it is virtually certain that they were not from the Bārāmbāy, but rather from the Ṣamāḡār or the followers of the Babukoğulları. The ʿulūs emirs who supported Burhān al-Dīn then should have included descendants of Ṣamāḡār noyan, and also of Bābbūq, whose descendant ʿAlī Pāšā ended up as not more than a local lord in a castle at a considerable distance from Sivas, and possibly representatives of other families (perhaps from the Jaygāzān or the Jāwūṅqār), but probably no descendants of Sütay noyan. This faction might therefore be called the Bābbūq and/or Ṣamāḡār faction, and the constant fighting over Kayseri would then be an extension of the Ṣamāḡār-Bārāmbāy strife which was so virulent during ʿAlī Beg’s lifetime.
There is one case, however, which does not fit into this picture, and trying to resolve it would probably involve too much conjecture. In the section on leading families, we have seen that Ḫwāja Beg could have been a leading representative of the Bārumbāy faction, and he was among those Mongol emirs who insisted on moving against Junaid at Kayseri, when Burhān al-Dīn had to defend himself against Erzincan instead, a situation which then led to open rebellion (see example no. 1 above). There are no clues in the text as to how this might be explained. Fission processes did not spare Mongol leading families, either.

Kayseri was very much under Mongol control, then. The city notables were apparently not enthusiastic about that, and there are reports that they sided with Burhān al-Dīn. (It should be remembered that Burhān al-Dīn had been born and raised at Kayseri and must have had many local connections; he also owned important rural properties in the vicinity, and he had worked as qāżī there for years.) We do not learn anything about how the Mongol lords used the city and its hinterland as a resource, and there is nothing we can say about taxation; the figures given in Qazwīnī for the tax revenues of Anatolian towns and districts refer to earlier decades and are certainly quite useless for the latter part of the fourteenth century.  

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152 On the other hand, there were also people in Sivas who invited Junaid (Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm p. 326). The city population of Sivas sometimes openly opposed Burhān al-Dīn for undisclosed reasons.

153 Qazwīnī has the following revenues (for 1336): Kayseri 140,000 dinars, Kemah 34,400 dinars, Nīğde 41,500 dinars, Niksar 187,000 dinars, Gedük 16,500 dinars, Kırşehir 57,000. Amasya and Sivas are mentioned as large towns, but no revenue is given. Develi has 40,300 dinars, Erzincan 332,500, Aḵṣehir of Erzincan 135,000 dinars. These figures are quoted here because they show some kind of relational order of magnitude, and also that at least some of the places that are fortresses rather than towns command revenues of the same order as larger cities. Thus, the difference between Aḵṣehir of Erzincan on the one hand and Kayseri on the other is not too big. The revenue extractable from all these places must have diminished because of ongoing military action and also depopulation due to the Black Death (Qazwīnī, Ḩamdallāh Mustauff, The geographical part of the Nuzhat al-qulūb, trans. G. Le Strange (Gibb Memorial Series, 23.2) Leyden and London: Brill, 1919): pp. 95-9. For a discussion of the value of the dinar and other questions related to this budget, see Togan, “Economic conditions”: pp. 223ff. For discussion of a (supposedly) 1350 budget, inserted in a mathematical treatise on accounting, the Risāla-yi falakīyya, see ibid.: p. 233, which however does not quote figures. Central Anatolia (roughly, the Eretma sultanate) is called al-wusṭāniyya, ‘the central regions’, in this text, and the subdistricts include, of the places mentioned in this article, Erzincan, Kemah, Sivas, Niksar, Kayseri, Develi, Tokat, Amasya, and a place called Karahisar and another called Aḵṣehir (since these names may refer to more than one place: Aḵṣehir is
as the other beys about local and regional lordship, which included ruling a
fortress, a town or a city, a rural hinterland and (much) pasture, so that
there were enough resources to build military power at least on a par with
immediate neighbours.

Conflicting claims on the territory around Kayseri are quite evident.
The region had belonged to the Eretna sultanate, and so the Sivas group,
Burhān al-Dīn and his Mongol allies or vassals, thought they were entitled
to use the corresponding resources, and they clearly had the support of
local forces. On the other hand, Kayseri had (albeit for a short while) come
under Karamanid control, and it is possible that the Karamanoğlu tried to
draw the city and its region into their orbit. Last but not least, there was a
group of Mongols who supported Junaid, or whose representative he was;
they did much to avoid a vassal relationship to Sivas, whereas they were
less averse to the Karaman. Junaid and his Mongols controlled the citadel
at Kayseri, but not always the city itself; they controlled some of the
fortresses, but apparently not the entire countryside; there was conflict
over pasture with other Mongols and presumably also the ‘Syrian Türkmen’s’. In all, Kayseri was at the same time a no man’s land, since
none of the competing forces could really establish its rule there, and a
land of many lords. Generally speaking, neither Sivas nor Kayseri was the
capital of a well-defined territory within which a well-established
individual ruled. Beyliks sometimes were not territories so much as
networks of mutual obligations, of alliances and vassalities.

**Summer camps: Ruling from the outside**

The Mongols in Astarābādī are not living in towns. If a Mongol leader
controlled an urban centre, it is the citadel that is signified, and sometimes
Mongol emirs are seen to reside in fortresses, whether urban or rural. But
the Mongol emirs as a group, the ʿumarā-yi ʿulūs or the tūšmālān, evidently
lived in tents, and they performed the seasonal migrations together with
the flocks and the ordinary nomads. In the winter camps, they came closer
together and were more accessible, whereas the summer camps were on
high ground and it was hard to attack them there. On one occasion, an

.probably Akçeşir of Erzincan, and Karahisar is probably Şarkı Karahisar). As in
Qazwīnī’s list, this one also lumps together major towns and places that are fortresses
rather than towns, but the fortresses evidently were not exclusively military structures.
See also Remler, Philipp: “New light on economic history from Ilkhanid accounting
manuals”, *StIr* 14 (1985), 155-77; and Hinz, Walther: *Die Resālā-yə Falakīyyā des
ʿAbdollah ibn Mohammad ibn Kiyy al-Māzandarānī. Ein persischer Leitfaden des
staatlichen Rechnungswesens*” (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1952).
attack during the spring migration seems to have been considered (on ʿAlī Pāšā b. Bābūzābādī); at that time nomads were indeed very vulnerable.

There are some reports about Burhān al-Dīn going to the summer pasture. The first time this is mentioned is rather late in the text; Burhān al-Dīn has succeeded in establishing himself more or less as a sultan. The sultan went to the Köse Dağ that year, and the Syrian Türkmens, who earlier had shown so much obstinate opposition, now came to greet him and offered appropriate gifts; they began to exert themselves in forms of obeisance and subordination (ba-marāsim-i ʿitāʿat wa istislām mubādarat namādand). The sultan stayed on “for some days” feasting and enjoying the summer camp, but then bad news came from Sivas and he had to go back.

The next time Burhān al-Dīn is shown on the summer pastures, it is again the Köse Dağ. He went there after the spring campaign was over, and apparently prepared an attack against Erzincan during his stay up in the mountains. It is not entirely clear whether the scene is still set there, but it would make sense to have the lord of Kemah come up and join the sultan.

The last item has been mentioned before (see above at note 28). After some victories in the north and a corresponding letter from the Mamluks, Burhān al-Dīn wanted to implement a union between the two ulūses, his Mongol followers and the Syrian Türkmens. In order to achieve this, he sent envoys to call for the gathering of troops and retainers (ijtimāʿ-i ʿasākir wa aḥšām-i naukarān).

What does Burhān al-Dīn do on the summer grazing grounds? He does not go there with his flocks – he has not become a pastoralist. But he uses a well-known procedure of “nomadic” rule. Not only did rulers enjoy the cooler air and the abundance of foodstuffs on the summer camp site, but the camp site was also a space where khans and sultans received the ceremonial visits of vassals and allies. This is approximately what happens in the first instance: the erstwhile “rebellious” Türkmens now showed their allegiance by paying the sultan a visit, by giving gifts and by doing obeisance. In the next instance, the summer camp is used as a deployment area, but possibly also as a space where a vassal joins the sultan, this time the lord of Kemah. It is the third narration, however, that best shows how

154 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 262.
155 Yücel places the following events after a Kayseri campaign in 1387 (Yücel, Anadolu Beylikleri: p. 118.
156 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 325.
157 Kemah was a very important fortress on the upper Euphrates controlling one of the routes leading to Erzincan.
158 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 530.
Burhān al-Dīn had learnt to use the summer camp: his aim this time was not a particular campaign and not the ṭāʿat of a smaller group, but the establishment of a completely new network of alliances and vassalages. Even if Burhān al-Dīn still does not move uphill together with the herds, this is a “typically nomadic” setting. A network of alliances and vassal relationships with nomads could hardly be forged anywhere else.\textsuperscript{159}

The section on cooperation above has shown that after some time spent in legitimacy debates, an important proportion of the Mongols within the erstwhile Eretna sultanate chose to follow Burhān al-Dīn. Mutual obligations meant that the sultan had to protect the nomads and to defend their interests, above all to secure their pasture and their migration routes. On the other hand, the Mongols had in return to participate in campaigns and this they did as far as their own interests were concerned, but they were much more reluctant in other cases. Debates and meetings most of the time took place at Sivas, at the sultan’s residence, in the ‘spring visit’ pattern. The summer camp now served as a setting for cooperation above all with Türkmens, but in the end a new perspective emerges: a network of domination still centred on the person of Burhān al-Dīn, but no longer linked to his residence or capital at Sivas, but to the summer pasture, probably at Köse Dağ.

Ruling from the summer pastures was part of the “ruling from the outside” paradigm\textsuperscript{160} that existed in many states in the Turco-Iranian world.\textsuperscript{161} Therefore, the new spatial setup of the Sivas sultanate was a step in what can be seen as a ‘nomadisation’ process in the ruling habitus of Burhān al-Dīn which was brought about not by his Mongol alliances so much as by new allies he had to accommodate, the Türkmens. As we have seen, Burhān al-Dīn’s Mongol allies were probably the group called Şamāğār (plus possibly some of the Bābūq followings); his

\textsuperscript{159} Summer camps were the preferred settings for ceremonies such as coronations in the Ilkhanid empire, ceremonial meetings such as quriltays and other important gatherings, down to the early Safavid period.


\textsuperscript{161} Many conquerors who came from the steppe into the Turco-Iranian world tried, and managed for quite a long time, to keep a spatial as well as social distance from the conquered peoples (Paul, Jürgen, “Perspectives nomads: États et structures militaires”, Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, LIX/5-6 [2004]: pp. 1069-93 [1086]) with examples and references. The ‘accluturation process’, which is so often taken simply for granted, was a drawn-out affair and worked in both directions: see Aubin, Jean, Emirs mongols, vizirs persans dans les remous de l’accluturation (Paris: Association pour l’Avancement des Etudes Iranienes, 1995).
relationship with the other group, the Bārambāy, was hostile. These Bārambāy had been allied to the earlier Eretnid ruler, ʿAlī Beg, who is scolded for this alliance. The Bārambāy went to war against the Şamāḡār when they learnt that ʿAlī Beg had been imprisoned. Before doing battle, they said that their objective was to free “our emir”, in order to attain this, they had to kill Hājjī Ibrāhīm, whose head was then exposed to the public, first at Hāvik (present-day Hafik), then at Sivas. ʿAlī Beg’s Mongol alliance – that is, the Bārambāy alliance – is time and again seen as a reason for disorder. Astarābādī of course does everything to point out that ʿAlī Beg is unfit to rule and that the only person able to save whatever can be saved out of the crumbling Eretna sultanate is Burhān al-Dīn. Moreover, more than once ʿAlī Beg seems to have fled to ‘the Mongols’ (probably the Bārambāy) and sometimes may also have joined them in their seasonal migrations. Ḥwāja Beg (probably the acting Bārambāy leader) evidently was his protector, ‘the man behind his throne’ (on him, see above at note 93). On the one hand, therefore, we could say that ʿAlī Beg was also ruling from the outside (if he ruled at all; we cannot decide whether the stories about his incompetence are all simply of Astarābādī’s making); in that, he was following the Mongol habitus. On the other hand, he was aware that he had a capital and that leaving his capital and its valuable hinterland would be tantamount to renouncing the throne.

The difference between ʿAlī Beg and Burhān al-Dīn is a difference of degree, not of kind. Both relied on their respective Mongol allies; both ruled ‘from the outside’ as well as from the capital; both had to protect their Mongol allies’ interests. Burhān al-Dīn may have been the leading part in the alliance, ʿAlī Beg may have had to comply with his Bārambāy ‘protectors’, and, of course, Burhān al-Dīn ruled mostly either from his

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162 Göde, Erətnalılar: p. 103. “Although ʿAlī Beg was a Turk [...] he thought of himself as a Mongol and therefore was the Bārambāy’s favourite. Thus, he earned the Turks’ hate and anger.” “Alâeddîn Ali aslen Türk olduğu halde [...] kendisini Moğol saymış ve bu sebeple de Barambaylar‘in gözdesi olurken, Türkler’în kin ve nefretini kazanmıştır”.

163 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 123.

164 Ibid.: p. 132.

165 Nagel, Timur der Eroberer. Astarābādī’s way of characterising ʿAlī Beg certainly is an important source for the way modern authors judge him.

166 Astarābādī, Bazm va Razm: p. 131; bā ḥūd guft az wasṭ-i dār al-mulk ki maqarr-i daulat wa mamarr-i iqbāl ast bīrān uṣīddan wa az sawād-i aʾzam wa ḡawal wa ḡadam bar maʿzal māndan [...] az šaub-ʾi šawāb wa simt-i sadād wa rišād ḡarīj wa munḥarif ast (ʿAlī Beg speaking).
capital or from his headquarters when on campaign, and there are only occasional stories that show him ruling from the summer pastures. Nevertheless, the Mongols in both cases were the most important single power in the state, and this showed in the way the ruler had to conduct business. More than once, Burhān al-Dīn is called back to Sivas, either from campaign or from the summer pastures, because there was a ‘revolt’ in the city, and the revolting townspeople sometimes allied themselves to outside powers.\footnote{167} The urbanites therefore were no real basis for Burhān al-Dīn, and without his Mongols, he would not have been able to hold out.

In the case of Junaid at Kayseri, there is no evidence about the summer and winter pastures his Mongol followers used, and it is not said whether Junaid followed them around. In the case of Kayseri, rule was even more precarious than it was at Sivas. If Kayseri was ruled almost exclusively by Mongols (the townspeople and some of the rural elites had chosen Burhān al-Dīn but could not impose themselves), politics in Sivas resulted from competition and cooperation between Burhān al-Dīn and the Mongol lords.

In spite of close cooperation, which sometimes seems to approach symbiosis, Burhān al-Dīn and the Mongol lords kept a spatial distance most of the time. Taken together, what we have here is a kind of dual rule; mutual obligations prevail throughout, and both partners (which are cast in a lord-vassal relationship) have their own social field. It is possibly this separation in space and also in the social field that can account for the difference Maqrīzī makes in a statement anachronistically dated to the beginning of the fourteenth century: When the last Rūm Seljuq ruler had died, he says, rule in Rūm fell to the Tatārs, excepting the realm of the Banū Eretna who ruled at Sivas.\footnote{168}

\section*{Conclusion}

When ʿAlī Beg died (of the plague in 1380), the fragmentation of the Eretna sultanate had already reached an advanced stage. The sultanate which had extended from Konya to Erzurum was much reduced, most visibly in the SW where the Karamanoğulları had profited from Eretnid weakness. But more important were the fission processes that took place within the sultanate itself. A number of regional and local lords had succeeded in carving out a domain for themselves. We do not have to decide whether they were ‘independent’ in a legal sense – that is, whether they struck coinage and had the Friday sermon read in their own name.

\footnote{167}Ibid.: pp. 326, 358.

\footnote{168}Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-sulūk: IV, p. 186, sub anno 718: baqāʾ al-mulk bi al-Rūm li-al-Ṭaṭar illā mulk banī Eretna fa-innahu baqāʾ bi-Sivas.
They were lords of beyliks in every practical sense. Some of them have made it into Bosworth (and into Turkish research), some not. There were the Tacettinoğulları at Niksar, the emir of Erzincan, Muṭahhartan, and Ḥājjī Ḫūrī at Sivas. We also have to name Ḥājjī Šād Geldi of Amasya; even if there is no dynasty called the ‘Ṣadgeldioğulları’, there certainly was a ‘house of Šād Geldi’, since there was at least one son, Aḥmad, to continue at Amasya. There were local rulers (a family around an emir called Qılıç Arslan) controlling Karahisar (Şebinkarahisar or Karahisar-ı Şarkı) together with Koyulhisar.¹⁶⁹ There were local lords at Kemah and probably also at Tokat. At first, Burḥān al-Dīn was in charge at Kayseri, but this region is a very special case, discussed at length above. The Mongol lords are less well represented in Astarābādī, but we can assume that there were at least three major groups, the Šāmāḡār (with a ruling house descended from Šāmāḡār noyan), the Bārānbāy (their ruling family descended from Bārānbāy b. Sütay noyan), and the followers of Bābūq (whose antecedents are undisclosed). We can assume that they held fortresses here and there, the Bābūq family possibly the town of Niğde and other fortresses. Other Mongol groups were living more to the north, and at least the Ḫāwūnqar later also formed a kind of beylik under an emir called Gözler. Thus, we get around ten regional or local lordships in the reduced territory that then made up the Eretna sultanate. Like the ulūs Čağatay some time earlier, and not unlike parts of Iran after the breakup of the Ilkhanate, Central Anatolia was fragmented into a larger number of complex regional lordships. They all included a major or at least mid-size town, or else an important fortress or two, some agricultural land and much pasture.

The Eretna sultanate had ceased to be a political reality, but it still was a framework of reference, and many people would have preferred a descendant of the house of Eretna to take over at least nominal rule. In a way, that was what happened: there was bitter rivalry over who was going to be the man behind the throne, the emir of Amasya and Burḥān al-Dīn posing as chief figures after Qılıç Arslan and Ḥājjī Ḫūrī had been killed, but there was a kind of consensus to let the very young son of the dead sultan assume the throne. The Mongols more than once made their influence felt: Mongol leaders and factions were more or less firmly allied to the named pretenders, and once a Mongol faction put forward its own

¹⁶⁹ Both are important fortresses on the road from Sivas to Erzincan. Shukurov lists them as a separate beylik (Shukurov, Rustam, “Between peace and hostility: Trebizond and the Pontic Turkish periphery in the fourteenth century”, Mediterranean Historical Review, IX/1 [1994]: pp. 20-72).
candidate, ‘Alī Pāšā b. Bābūq, who was not to be sultan, however, but the ‘man behind the throne’.

No simple solution was reached. Burhān al-Dīn took the throne, but he was never able to expand his rule over the entirety of the territories where ‘Alī Beg’s dominion had been accepted at least in principle. Amasya was never taken, and neither was Erzincan. There was much trouble in Kayseri, and a new Mongol beylik under Junaid’s leadership was established there for a while. Only part of the Mongols supported Burhān al-Dīn; an important group, the Bārambāy, was consistently hostile and supported either Amasya or Junaid or both. Burhān al-Dīn tried to pursue an expansionist strategy, but he was not as successful in that as Astarābādī would have us believe. Even his regional rivals, the Karamanoğlu, Mutahhartan and the emir of Amasya, were too strong for him to subdue them permanently. He might well win a victory or two over them, but he could not exterminate them, and he could never join either Amasya or Erzincan to his domains, not to speak of Konya or Karaman. Even less could he expect to cope with the long-term advance of the Ottomans or with the sudden Timurid invasion. He succeeded in driving the Syrian Mamluks away from Sivas once, but he did so by the skin of his teeth.170 Moreover, he was not secure even at home in Sivas. More than once, he had to return in a hurry because a revolt had flared up within the city or some urban faction had made common cause with an external enemy.

Fission therefore seemed to be definitive. Even if Burhān al-Dīn tried to restore the Eretna sultanate at all costs, he proved unable to do so. The regional and local lords who ruled in the neighbouring beyliks simply did not accept him as their overlord. Legitimacy was, of course, an issue, and doubts about Burhān al-Dīn’s right to occupy the throne were voiced even long years after he had ascended it.

Lindner sees the main obstacle for expansionist strategies in the Anatolian beyliks in the meagre resources they commanded.171 Another might be the almost even distribution of resources, so that a number of rivals were almost equally strong. A subtle play of alliances, including outside allies such as the Ottomans, the Mamluks or – later – Timur also precluded expansion. For many of the competing beyliks, Mongol nomads (in other cases, Türkmen nomads) were the single most important source of military manpower. None of the beylik rulers in the second half of the fourteenth century succeeded in gaining more than a passing advantage in rallying decisively larger groups of nomads to his cause; the Mongols (and

171 Lindner, “Anatolia”.
also the Türkmens) were as divided among themselves as the beylik rulers were.

There was, however, one element in Burhān al-Dīn’s career that probably contributed even more to his eventual failure. His personal following is mentioned frequently in the source (in the literary topos of a following of 300 mounted warriors or in even smaller numbers, going down as far as the equally topical seven; a standard term for this personal following is kaukiha, literally ‘constellation’). But we do not learn how this group of personal followers was recruited. In the case of successful ‘nomadic’ empire-builders, this personal following plays an eminently important role. They are men who have gone through the many hardships of the ruler’s earlier career, they come from the most divergent backgrounds, from leading as well as ordinary families, and they have no ties beside the tie to their lord. Later, they can expect to gain high positions, and after the first victories their lord wins (with their help) over his regional rivals, they are appointed as leaders over larger numbers of troops and also as governors over conquered territories (the paradigmatic case of course is Timur).172

Burhān al-Dīn’s personal following was possibly of a different kind. Military slaves are not mentioned, but neither do we get to know any of these followers by name, with one exception – the military leader and perhaps personal companion Aḥī ʿĪsā. Burhān al-Dīn’s beylik very much looks like a one-man show. He never had to attract personal followers in long years of a precarious roaming existence (qazaqlıq), and he therefore never had the trusted followers of the type Timur could rely on. In a sense, his attempt at restoring the Eretna sultanate failed not because he was too nomadic, but because he was not nomadic enough.

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